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ABSTRACT 
The United Kingdom, along with other European states, is facing a crisis 
brought on by rapid demographic changes and failed integration efforts.  While 
the United Kingdom takes great pride in its past multicultural policies, it finds 
itself increasingly estranged from its Muslim minority community while seeing a 
notable rise in the growth of radicalism.  The 2005 subway bombings symbolized 
the failure of Britain’s multiculturalism for a shocked public.  The belief in the 
superiority of the United Kingdom’s multicultural framework suffered a severe 
setback on that day.  The United Kingdom is now attempting to develop a new 
policy framework.   
The question posited in the thesis title is difficult to answer.  Based on all 
the evidence, multiculturalism as it was applied appears to have been a large 
part of the problem.  A differentiated citizenship approach in the public realm 
does not appear to be a viable strategy to produce social harmony.  But, a new 
form of multiculturalism that allows for differentiated citizenship in the private 
sphere while actively attempting to foster a shared public culture appears to have 
a much higher chance of success.  There is not a single definitive answer to the 
challenges facing the United Kingdom but, based on the analysis of current 
evidence, a new form of multiculturalism that attempts to produce a shared public 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1 
A. IMPORTANCE ..................................................................................... 3 
B.  LITERATURE REVIEW........................................................................ 4 
1. General Literature on Europe’s Integration Challenges....... 4 
2. Multiculturalism in England.................................................... 6 
3. General Theories of Multiculturalism..................................... 9 
C. ARGUMENT OF THESIS................................................................... 11 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.................................................... 12 
II. ENGLAND’S MULTICULTURAL JOURNEY ............................................... 13 
A. GROWTH OF ENGLAND’S MUSLIM MINORITY COMMUNITY ...... 14 
B. THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DIVIDE ................................................ 21 
C. THE MULTICULTURAL RESPONSE................................................ 22 
D. MULTICULTURALISM TODAY:  IS IT BREAKING DOWN?............ 24 
E. MULTICULTURALISM GOING FORWARD:  CAN IT BE 
ADAPTED TO MEET THE CHALLENGES OF TODAY?.................. 35 
III. THEORIES OF MULTICULTURALISM ........................................................ 39 
A. DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP ..................................................... 40 
B. SPHERE THEORIES ......................................................................... 44 
C. SYNCHRONIZING THE TWO THEORIES......................................... 56 
IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: ENGLAND’S CURRENT POLICY 
FRAMEWORK.............................................................................................. 57 
A. MAKING BETTER CITIZENS ............................................................ 57 
B. OUTREACH TO MUSLIM COMMUNITIES........................................ 63 
C.  FIGHTING RADICALISM AT ITS SOURCE ...................................... 66 
D. TACKLING DISCRIMINATION AND DISADVANTAGE.................... 71 
E. CONCLUSION ................................................................................... 73 
V. CONCLUSION.............................................................................................. 75 
LIST OF REFERENCES.......................................................................................... 81 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ................................................................................. 85 
 
 viii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 ix
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I would like to thank Dr. Zachary Shore and Professor James Russell for 
their guidance and patience throughout this project.   
 x
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xi
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The United Kingdom, along with other European states, is facing a crisis 
brought on by rapid demographic changes and failed integration efforts.  While 
the United Kingdom took great pride in its multicultural policies of the past, it 
found itself increasingly estranged from its Muslim minority community while 
seeing a notable rise in the growth of radicalism.  The assumption that these 
policies were working was challenged by the 9/11 attacks in America and then 
shattered by the 2005 subway bombings. 
In the wake of these attacks, the United Kingdom is attempting to develop 
a new policy framework.  This thesis starts by looking at the history that led to the 
current situation in the United Kingdom as well as how its past policies 
developed.  It then looks at two different theories on multiculturalism, the 
differentiated citizenship approach and the Spheres Theory.  It examines the 
emerging policy framework in the United Kingdom in light of these two theories to 
try and ascertain how they can best be applied in the case England.   
The multicultural policies of the past in the United Kingdom can best be 
described as a somewhat laissez faire differentiated citizenship approach that 
engaged citizens first and foremost based on their cultural identity.  The state is 
now moving away from this approach towards one that is better defined by the 
spheres theories of Hannah Arrendt and John Rex with the goal of creating a 
shared public culture in which everyone has a stake.  The state appears to be 
making some mistakes along the way by not being consistent in its policies and 
taking actions that can potentially undermine this goal.  But, overall, there 
appears to be a clear move towards reversing the policy framework towards one 
that attempts to emphasize commonalities versus celebrating differences, 
especially within the public sphere.   
One of the greatest challenges to the success of this approach is the 
spread of radicalism.  The United Kingdom has become one of the biggest 
 xii
hotbeds for radical Islam in the world today.  As such, the state is developing a 
much more aggressive approach in not just combating terrorism, but also 
attempting to stop the spread of ideas that lead to terrorism.  One of the biggest 
questions that remain unanswered is whether this will ultimately under mine the 
state’s efforts to create a shared public culture.  Although these actions are 
important, they also risk alienating a larger portion of the Muslim community.  
The question posed in the title to the thesis is hard to answer.  Based on 
all the evidence, multiculturalism as it was applied appears to have been a large 
part of the problem.  A differentiated citizenship approach in the public realm 
does not appear to be a good strategy based on past results.  But, a new form of 
multiculturalism that allows for differentiated citizenship in the private sphere 
while actively attempting to foster a shared public culture appears to have a 
much higher chance of success.  There is not a single definitive answer to the 
challenges facing the United Kingdom but, based on the analysis of current 
evidence, a new form of multiculturalism that attempts to produce a shared public 






Europe is undergoing large-scale demographic changes.  The fertility 
rates among the ethnic Europeans are extremely low with most of the states 
ranging between 1.2 and 1.4 children per woman.  These rates point to a trend 
that is resulting and will continue to result in the population both rapidly shrinking 
in size and aging.  At the same time, the continent has continued to see a large 
number of mostly Muslim immigrants arrive from nearby North Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia.  In a number of European countries, the words “immigrant” and 
“Muslim” are used interchangeably.1  The birthrate disparity between the two 
communities at this time is startling with fertility rates among the Muslim minority 
communities registering more than three times higher than those of the ethnic 
Europeans.2  The result is a rapidly growing and youthful Muslim minority across 
much of Europe next to a rapidly aging ethnic European population.  Estimates 
range from Muslims comprising at least 20 percent of the population by 2050 with 
some scholars and demographers predicting that Muslims will be a majority by 
that time.3   
The European states have struggled to integrate this minority community 
into their social fabric.  Unemployment remains very high with many Muslims 
living in segregated ghettoes around Western Europe’s major cities.  Social 
integration has been slow due to both the reluctance of European states to find 
effective integration strategies and because many members within the Muslim 
community have actively resisted integration into a culture they feel is 
incompatible with their own religiously oriented culture.  Some European states 
were perceived to have been more successful than others in their integration 
                                            
1 Timothy M. Savage. “Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing,”  The 
Washington Quarterly 27, no. 3 (Summer 2004): p. 27. 
2 Ibid., p. 28. 
3 Oussama Cherribi. “The Growing Islamization of Europe,” in Modernizing Islam:  Religion in 
the Public Sphere in Europe and the Middle East, ed. John Esposito and Francois Burgat (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2003), p. 195. 
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efforts but this assumption is increasingly being called into question.  England 
and the Netherlands have generally been held up as positive examples of 
integration within much of the literature since they adopted a multiculturalism 
approach while France and Germany are often viewed as negative examples as 
countries more hostile to minority communities.  While this is at best an 
oversimplification and is likely a false assumption, this was the perception in 
much of the literature.   
The problem with this assumption is that it gives far too much credit to 
states like England and the Netherlands, assuming they have been more 
successful than the evidence shows.  Even those states that have aggressively 
pursued integration through multiculturalism have only had moderate and 
temporary success at best.  Muslim attitudes in England as revealed in various 
survey results still raise serious questions.  For example, a recent survey 
revealed that 37% of 16-25 year old British Muslims would prefer to live under 
sharia law and 13% admitted to admiring organizations like Al-Qaeda committed 
to fighting the West.4  A number of other surveys have also been conducted in 
England, all of which bear relatively similar, if not more troubling, results.  That 
number is probably lower than the true number since it is unlikely that everyone 
would answer truthfully to that question out of concern for possible retributive 
actions by the state.  This raises some challenging questions about how effective 
multiculturalism can be as an integration strategy, particularly when survey data 
shows a growing disconnect among the younger generation of Muslims with non-
Muslims in states employing this strategy.  While it is possible that England’s 
integration strategy of multiculturalism may not be connected with what appears 
to be a growing radicalization of Muslim youth within the state, it is worth 
considering.   
                                            
4 Munira Mirza, Abi Senthilkumaran and Zein Ja’far.  “Living Apart Together: British Muslims 
and the Paradox of Multiculturalism.”  Policy Exchange.  www.policyexchange.org.uk, 2007.  
Accessed 4 May 2007. 
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By looking at the case of England, this thesis will grapple with the 
question, “Is multiculturalism a viable strategy for integrating rapidly growing 
Muslim minority communities in Europe or is it causing much of the tension?”  It 
will further attempt to identify ways in which a multicultural approach can be 
adapted to better meet the challenges of integrating this minority community by 
drawing broad applications from the theoretical and practical literature on 
multiculturalism.   
While multiculturalism is a fluid term meaning many things to many 
people, it is defined here as the specific policies of the state aimed at supporting 
or integrating different cultures within a society with the goal of social cohesion 
and respect between cultural groups.   
A. IMPORTANCE 
One of the most pressing concerns across Europe is finding a way to 
integrate rapidly growing Muslim minority communities.  The European states 
must find a balanced integration strategy that works or they face a future that will 
be marked by social unrest and hostility between a shrinking ethnic European 
majority community and a rapidly growing Islamic minority community alienated 
from society.  One possible approach that is being tried in most of the countries 
to varying degrees is multiculturalism.  It is important to try and ascertain the 
strengths and weaknesses of this approach in order to either discard it or adapt it 
in a way that will be more effective in providing social cohesion.  There is a 
limited window of opportunity for European governments to find a solution before 
the problem becomes intractable.  Based on the demographic data, that will 
happen sooner rather than later.  
 4
B.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
1. General Literature on Europe’s Integration Challenges 
There is a wide body of general literature on Europe’s integration 
challenges.  Much of the academic literature has tended to place much of the 
responsibility for the social strife on European integration failures.  This school of 
thought argues that Europe has failed to accommodate the Muslim community 
and has been hostile to that community.  Under this argument, Europe has 
largely produced or at least enabled the radicals in its midst and created the 
conditions for social unrest.  This theme is present in Zachary Shore’s Breeding 
Bin Ladens:  America, Islam and the Future of Europe5 as well as Oussama 
Cherribi’s chapter “The Growing Islamization of Europe”6 and Stephanie Giry’s 
“France and its Muslims,”7 among others.  It is worth noting that these books and 
articles also site the spread of radical Islam as a significant challenge with 
Zachary Shore’s book also discussing the impact of American foreign policy and 
the divergence between mainstream European and fundamentalist Muslim 
values, but much of the focus within the academic literature is on Europe’s poor 
response to the challenge.  This literature does a convincing job in explaining 
some of the negative attitudes among Muslims in countries like France and 
Germany whose policies have certainly exacerbated the tensions but does not 
provide as clear of an answer in relation to countries like England and the 
Netherlands which, at least on the surface, have been much more pro-active and 
positive in attempting to integrate their minority communities or at least in actively 
fighting discrimination and promoting tolerance on their behalf.   
Much of the bookstore literature has tended to place most of the blame on 
the Muslim minority communities.  Again, it is important to caveat that this 
                                            
5 Zachary Shore, Breeding Bin Ladens: America, Islam, and the Future of Europe (Baltimore, 
MD: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006).   
6 Cherribi, Modernizing Islam, p. 195. 
7 Stephanie Giry, “France and its Muslims,”  Foreign Affairs 85, no. 5 (Sep/Oct 2006): pp. 87-
103. 
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literature has also acknowledged that Europe’s response to the challenge has 
not helped the situation.  But, their primary focus is on the spread of radical Islam 
and the problems it is creating in Europe, particularly against the backdrop of 
rapid demographic shifts.  This literature argues that Muslims have proactively 
taken steps to resist integration and have ensured that their children also do not 
integrate.  Underlying this argument is the belief that Islam, by its nature, is 
inherently resistant and even hostile to integration within a non-Islamic 
community.  This is a common theme cited by conservative Canadian 
commentator and writer Mark Steyn, a theme that permeated his recent 
bestseller America Alone:  The End of the World as we Know It8.  It was also the 
theme of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept9 and played a prominent role in Bat 
Ye’or’s Eurabia: The Euro-Arab Axis10.  Steyn succinctly stated the argument in 
his book, “So we have a global terrorist movement insulated within a global 
political project insulated within a severely self-segregating religion whose 
adherents are the fasted-growing demographic in the developed world.”11 These 
books are representative of a growing body of literature whose argument can 
perhaps be labeled as cultural exclusiveness, meaning they argue that there is 
something inherently exclusive about Islam, or at least a rapidly expanding 
radical Islam that draws its ideological roots from Saudi Arabia, that makes many 
Muslims unwilling to integrate into non-Muslim states.   
While there are clearly serious challenges to integrating Muslim 
communities because of a religious culture that is sometimes at odds with 
secular European culture, this appears at times to be an oversimplification of the 
challenge.  For one, older generations of Muslims in Europe appear to have 
integrated much better within the state than younger generations who were 
                                            
8 Mark Steyn.  America Alone:  The End of the World as We Know It (Washington D.C.: 
Regnery Publishing, 2006). 
9 Bruce Bawer, While Europe Slept:  How Radical Islam is Destroying the West from Within 
(New York:  Doubleday, 2006). 
10 Bat Ye’or, Eurabia:  The Euro-Arab Axis (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 
2005). 
11 Mark Steyn. America Alone. p. 63. 
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actually born in those states.  This is explained in a number of ways throughout 
the literature, either as a result of something happening within the Muslim 
communities such as the spread of a more virulent form of Islam, often attributed 
to Saudi Arabian funding, or as something resulting from European policies, such 
as a response within the Islamic communities to secularism and multiculturalism.  
This literature does not provide a clear answer on this discrepancy.  This 
literature can also appear defeatist since it is essentially arguing that Europe is 
already lost due to irreconcilable differences and demographic trends that will 
rapidly overcome these states.  Indeed, Steyn’s book reads somewhat like a 
European obituary at times. 
2. Multiculturalism in England 
A narrower strand in the literature specifically addresses and evaluates 
the individual integration strategies being employed by states throughout Europe.  
In the case of England, that strategy is almost universally recognized as 
multiculturalism with various arguments being posited throughout the literature on 
the challenges and opportunities of multiculturalism within that state.  An early 
definition of British multiculturalism was offered in 1968 by then British Home 
Secretary Roy Jenkins who “defined integration as ‘not a process of flattering 
uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an 
atmosphere of mutual tolerance.’”12  This is a fairly accurate description of 
multiculturalism in practice as it evolved in England, equal opportunity and 
protection against discrimination in the political and public realm and sanctioned 
cultural diversity in the private realm that extends into the public realm.  Another 
author defines England’s approach to multiculturalism, dating back to the 1960s, 
as “promoting tolerance and integration while allowing immigrants and ethnic 
                                            
12 John Rex, Ethnic Minorities in the Modern Nation State: Working Papers in the Theory of 
Multiculturalism and Political Integration (New York:  St. Martin’s Press, 1996). pp. 236-237. 
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groups to maintain cultural identities and customs.”13  While definitions of British 
multiculturalism vary, most identify access to citizenship, equal opportunity in the 
public realm, and cultural diversity as key facets of it. 
One of the newer arguments within the literature is that multiculturalism in 
England is creating many of the problems it is trying to avoid by accentuating 
differences while failing to produce a culture that is attractive.  This was the 
theme of a recent article by Policy Exchange titled “Living Apart Together:  British 
Muslims and the Paradox of Multiculturalism.”14  The authors of this study argue 
that the government should engage Muslims as citizens of the state as opposed 
to focusing on their religious identity.  This literature also argues that the 
community is not homogenous and by treating it as such, the state is alienating 
part of the community while strengthening the hand of radicals who are treated 
as the authentic Muslims and the voice of the entire community.  In some ways, it 
is taking a diverse community and trying, and at times succeeding to its 
detriment, to make it into a monolithic community. 
A possible problem with this study is that it fails to account for different 
potential degrees of multiculturalism and attributes potential British failures to 
multiculturalism itself.  It is not alone in this tendency.  One writer observed, “So 
far, it appears that absolute assimilation has failed in France, but so has 
segregation in Germany and multiculturalism in the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom.  Could there be another way?”15  Statements like this perhaps should 
carry an important caveat.  Multiculturalism in the form in which it has been 
applied appears to be failing.  This does not necessarily mean that the approach 
could not be changed to potentially produce a different outcome.  Within the 
general literature on multiculturalism, there are various definitions and degrees 
                                            
13 Paul Gallis, Kristin Archick, Francis Miko and Steven Woehrel.  Muslims in Europe: 
Integration Policies in Selected Countries. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, 
18 November 2005, p. 12. 
14 Mirza, Policy Exchange.   
15 Robert Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,”  Foreign Affairs.  (July/August 2005): p. 7. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20050701faessay84409-p0/robert-s-leiken/europe-s-angry-
muslims.html. Accessed 3 September 2007. 
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attributed to the term and it can mean any number of things.  So, literature that 
argues that multiculturalism is the cause of the problem in England without 
specifying different degrees and manifestations of multiculturalism is actually 
arguing that the specific type of multiculturalism being executed in England is the 
problem.  These authors do succeed in calling into question whether England 
should really be viewed as the shining integration model that some believe it.  
While some may still view England as a positive case study in integration, they 
are doing it against all available evidence. 
However, the point that England is treating the Muslim minority community 
as a homogeneous block is a problem that is consistent with much of the general 
literature that is critical of multiculturalism which warns against treating groups as 
if they were homogeneous in composition when they are much more diverse.  
For example, one scholar observed, “The problem with some approaches to 
multiculturalism, however, is that they often work as if each ‘group’, whether 
defined according to religion, for example Muslims, or geographical origin, for 
example as coming from the continent of Africa…is homogeneous in 
composition.”16  This appears to be part of the problem with British 
multiculturalism as it evolved.  It tended to treat the Muslim community as a 
monolithic block and even encouraged people to view themselves this way 
through the benefits and incentives it offered.  This problem may be exacerbated 
further in England where the potential result is the empowering of the most 
radical segment of the minority population at the expense of the other segments 
of that population who are overlooked.   
The literature emanating from England on the subject tends to “stress the 
exceptionalism of the British experience in relation to its neighbors.”17  In other 
words, England is portrayed as the sterling example of what integration should 
look like in Europe, a point of real pride as part of the national narrative, while the 
                                            
16 Kum-Kum Bhavnani.  “Towards a Multicultural Europe?: ‘Race,’ Nation and Identity in 
1992 and beyond.” Feminist Review 45 (Autumn 1993): pp. 30-45. 
 9
rest of Europe is cast in generally negative terms.  The assumption is that 
continental Europe should be emulating the English model.  The author who 
made this observation argues that England should engage in comparative 
studies with other cases in Europe to try and overcome problems that are 
emerging, and that “Britain would do well to accept there are migration 
phenomenon that nation-states simply cannot deal with on their own.”18  While 
arguing that England adopted the right policies in the past and achieved real 
progress, Favell concedes that “the liberal and even quite visionary institutional 
solution fashioned in Britain in the 1960s and 1970s is now increasingly less 
responsive to the realities of migration, ethnic diversity and global economic 
forces in the 21st century.”19  The problem, in his words, springs from “yet 
unrecognized exogenous factors.”20  In other words, England’s multicultural 
solution was a good one but for an unknown reason it is not working anymore.  
Based on the current situation that England finds itself in, describing the policies 
of the past as visionary might be giving them far too much credit. Still, following 
Favell’s line of reasoning would seem to argue for a modification of the existing 
approach vice throwing it out and starting over with a new approach. 
3. General Theories of Multiculturalism 
In the general literature on multiculturalism, one of the dominant ideas on 
how it should be applied in a state is what one scholar described as differentiated 
citizenship.21  This simply means that the state should engage citizens differently 
based upon their cultural identities with different rights and privileges being 
granted to different groups.  In other words, different cultural groups should be 
                                            
17 Adrian Favell, “Multi-ethnic Britain:  an exception in Europe?”  Patterns of Prejudice  35, 
No. 1.  (January 2001): p. 35. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Favell. “Mult-ethnic Britain.” p. 35. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Matteo Gianni, “Multiculturalism and Political Integration: The Need for Differentiated 
Citizenship.” in Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity.  ed. Hans-Rudolf Wicker (Oxford, England: 
Berg Publishing, 1997). 
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treated differently in terms of citizenship rights.  The goal is “to integrate people 
despite their cultural difference, without renouncing the liberal commitment of 
individual liberty and equality.”22  This literature does argue that this should not 
jeopardize the basic rights of citizenship, which must be protected for everyone.  
Matteo Gianni argues that “differentiated citizenship should entail an enrichment 
of rights for the individual, but never diminution of those rights due to 
membership in a cultural group.”23  Charles Taylor, one of the earliest 
multicultural theorists, also falls within this group, although his focus is more on 
the importance of recognition and the need “to recognize the equal value of 
different cultures; that we not only let them survive, but acknowledge their 
worth.”24  This thesis will explore whether these ideas on differentiated 
citizenship can hold potential for England and whether a differentiated citizenship 
approach can be an important part of any solution.  It will also look at how the 
past multicultural policies followed this model and what they resulted in within the 
state.  Clearly, any policy that differentiates between citizens of a state must be 
very carefully applied to avoid either threatening core liberties and political 
equality or causing social strife. 
Another important writer within the general literature on multiculturalism is 
John Rex who advanced Hannah Arendt’s Sphere Theory.25  Arendt’s theory 
subdivided society into a public, a social, and a private sphere and argued that 
“the democratic state has a different set of controlling functions in each of the 
three spheres”26  The defining principle in the public sphere is equality among 
individuals while the defining characteristic in the private sphere is that the state 
                                            
22 Gianni, Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity: p. 140. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Charles Taylor. Multiculturalism and ‘The Politics of Recognition.’ (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1992). 
25 Hans-Rudolph Wicker. “Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and 
John Rex.” in Rethinking Nationalism and Ethnicity.  ed. Hans-Rudolf Wicker. (Oxford, England: 
Berg Publishing, 1997). 
26 Ibid., p. 146. 
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has “no right to intervene …unless constitutional laws are being violated.”27  The 
social sphere falls somewhere in between.  John Rex, in the same tradition, 
divides society into two domains, the public-political and the private.28 Societies 
fall into one of four possibilities depending on whether they let multiculturalism 
function in both of the two domains, neither of the two domains, or in one but not 
the other.  In writing specifically about England, Rex observed,  
I have suggested,,,in a number of papers…the notion of a culture in 
two separate ‘domains,’ that of the public political domain which is 
shared and should not be questioned by any group, the other the 
private domain of the family and the community.  The question then 
is how far British people and their politicians on one hand and 
Muslim minorities on the other are willing to accept this ‘two 
domains’ thesis and what they would see as falling within each of 
the domains.29 
This theory may have a tremendous amount of utility in terms of trying to 
modify a multicultural approach, particularly when combined with the 
differentiated citizenship approach.  It may also point to real shortcomings in 
multiculturalism as a strategy in England. 
C. ARGUMENT OF THESIS 
While England achieved some minor successes by establishing a 
multicultural policy framework in response to a growing Muslim minority 
community, these policies no longer appear to be working and it appears that the 
initial policy framework did little more than push the problem down the road.  This 
paper will explore the question of why England’s current form of multiculturalism 
appears to be failing.  This assessment is supported both by an increase in social 
tensions within England and is based on survey results revealing problematic 
attitudes among members of the Muslim minority community.  The thesis will 
                                            
27 Hans-Rudolph Wicker. “Multiculturalism and the Sphere Theories of Hannah Arendt and 
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show that there is a surprising relationship between British multiculturalism and 
the changing attitudes among the younger generation of Muslims in the state.  
While British multiculturalism is not the only cause for the growing radicalization 
of the younger generation of Muslims, it has done little to alleviate the problem 
and in fact has exacerbated it.  The paper will also examine potentially new ways 
in which multiculturalism as an integration strategy can be applied by examining 
two theories from within the general literature on multiculturalism, differentiated 
citizenship and the Sphere Theory.  England’s current approach will be evaluated 
within the framework of these theories as well as the more general literature on 
multiculturalism.  I will also look at how various variables such as economic 
conditions, religion, and citizenship fit into the multicultural approach. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will focus on a single case study in England while 
acknowledging that many other states across Europe are experiencing similar 
challenges.  It will rely on secondary sources that lay out different theoretical 
approaches to multiculturalism as well as secondary sources that discuss current 
British integration policies.  It will also examine secondary sources to ascertain 





II. ENGLAND’S MULTICULTURAL JOURNEY 
England has a long and proud history of multiculturalism that dates back 
to the country’s post-colonial policies.  It has become an important part of the 
nation’s national identity, a real point of pride.  In fact, many in England view its 
multicultural practices as a key part of the nation’s identity, viewing England as 
something special and cosmopolitan as opposed to the less enlightened nations 
of Europe on the continent.  While this is a gross oversimplification since some 
nations on the continent have taken a similar approach to England, it has taken 
on the form of conventional wisdom in the United Kingdom.  As one writer noted, 
writers in England “often affirm a surprising national faith in the vision of a proud 
multi-ethnic Britain in the world.”30  Part of this national faith in the multicultural 
state likely dates back to the different character of the many nations within the 
United Kingdom and the founding of the nation.  As one report pointed out, 
“multiculturalism was a natural choice for the United Kingdom, given that it was 
already an assembly of nations (English, Scottish, Welsh, plus the communities 
of Northern Ireland.)”31  So, in a sense, the adoption of a multicultural approach 
to Muslim immigration was an easy answer for a nation that was already a 
collection of different peoples.  This faith had somewhat blinded many in England 
to the potential for problems to emerge both because of the rapid growth of a 
minority community and England’s response to it. 
While the country’s multicultural policies are viewed as a matter of pride 
by many commentators and academics across England, there are increasingly 
signs that the policies are no longer achieving their goals, the most important of 
which is social harmony.  What is becoming increasingly clear is that England’s 
policy of multiculturalism is not the definitive final answer that many once thought 
of it.  This likely has a lot to do with the forces of globalization and the increasing 
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interconnectedness of the world which helps transmit the best of trends around 
the world as well as the pathologies.  While the United Kingdom’s multicultural 
solution may have worked fairly well in its early years, it appears far less 
responsive today.  Radical Islamic fundamentalism has not only taken hold within 
the United Kingdom but appears to be growing ever stronger.  The July 2005 
subway bombings served to shock the nation, especially when it was revealed 
that the perpetrators were born in the United Kingdom.  People in England woke 
up haunted by the realization that there was a growing minority that was hostile 
to the state and willing to act on that hostility.  In fact, England had become 
something of a safe space for radical preachers who were not able to operate 
openly in other places.  Many within the United Kingdom are wondering how to 
respond to this challenge and whether multiculturalism remains the answer.  This 
appears to be a real period of soul searching for the nation with the future 
somewhat in doubt. 
A. GROWTH OF ENGLAND’S MUSLIM MINORITY COMMUNITY  
In order to understand how England’s multicultural policies arrived at 
where they are today, it is helpful to chart the historical evolution of the Muslim 
minority community in England and the nation’s response to its growth.  The 
experience of England with a Muslim minority dates back at least a couple 
hundred years when “small numbers of Bengali and Yemeni sailors entered the 
port cities of London, Glasgow and Cardiff, taking work in local garment factories 
and restaurants.”32  The population remained very small and somewhat 
unnoticeable and did not surge until after World War II.  Up until that time, people 
barely took notice of the minority population. 
Following the war, men from primarily South Asia migrated to England in 
search of work, particularly as part of the rebuilding efforts that followed the war.  
Most of these men came from former British colonies, particularly Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and India.  It is worth noting that this trend was not isolated to 
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England but was “paralleled by Muslim migrations which are part of the labor 
migrations to other West European countries, especially migration from the 
Maghreb to France and the Benelux countries and Turkish migration to 
Germany.”33  So, as far as the post-war migration was concerned, England was 
not exceptional in the least but part of a broader trend.  In all of these cases, 
historical ties were an important predictor in the labor movements that led to the 
establishment and growth of Muslim communities.   
In the United Kingdom, these immigrant men settled in the north and 
midlands areas where there was a high demand for labor and lived in 
concentrated communities within the towns taking “poorly paid, night-shift work 
that the local white population did not want to do.”34  The arrival of these workers 
was initially seen as a temporary phenomenon and again the state paid little 
attention to it.  As one writer noted, “The arrival of such newcomers was never 
seen as immigration as such but rather as an anomaly, a one time phenomenon, 
and caused little discomfort in the countries where these people sought refuge.  
Moreover, these immigrants were easily absorbed in expanding labor markets.”35  
Because of the devastation of World War II, the economy needed a significant 
number of workers to rebuild what had been destroyed so it absorbed nearly all 
the new workers with little effort or social disturbance.   
There was no real debate within the host countries as to how the states 
should respond to the immigrants or what protection and services the state 
should provide.  As one article noted, “A sense of guilt over Europe’s colonial 
past and then World War II, when intolerance exploded into mass murder,  
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allowed a large migration to occur without any uncomfortable debates over the 
real differences between migrant and host.”36  Within this political climate, the 
large post-war migration flow was somewhat ignored.   
While it was always assumed that many of the migrant workers would 
return to their countries of origin, this never came to pass.  But, because this 
assumption remained in place, the state remained somewhat blind to the fact that 
the community was growing so rapidly and was not prepared for the tensions this 
would cause.  Even following the oil-crisis of the mid-1970s when many of the 
“guest workers” lost their jobs, they chose to stay on in their new countries.37  
Again, England was no exception to this rule.  In the two decades that followed, 
chain migration of friends and relatives followed helping to form “tight-knit ethnic 
and cultural communities.”38  There were also a significant number of Indian 
families who were forced to migrate to the United Kingdom as part of the 
“‘Africanisation’ policies of some East African countries.”39  This added even 
greater numbers to these communities.  As Robert Leiken concludes,  
The mass immigration of Muslims to Europe was an unintended 
consequence of post-World War II guest-worker programs.  Backed 
by friendly politicians and sympathetic judges, foreign workers, who 
were supposed to stay temporarily, benefited from family 
reunification programs and became permanent.  Successive waves 
of immigrants formed a sea of descendants.40   
The countries of Europe finally took note of the rapid growth and initiated 
laws to stem the flow of immigrants, most notably in 1973 during an economic 
slowdown.  These laws were largely a failure.  As one scholar observed while 
commenting on tighter immigration laws following the economic slowdown of the 
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early 1970s, “Fearing they would be permanently banned from Europe if they 
returned to their countries of origin, most workers decided to stay and bring their 
families, benefiting from a policy of ‘family reunion’ that was initiated to smooth 
the consequences of the immigration ban.”41  These initial attempts across 
Europe to stem the immigration tide were almost universally a failure and the 
number of immigrants flowing into Europe remained high.   
The minority communities did not really represent a visible presence in 
England until the late 1960s when their growing numbers and affluence enabled 
them to build mosques and create larger social networks and social 
organizations.  Not surprisingly, religion was an important part of life for these 
first and second generation immigrants who were in a somewhat unfamiliar and 
sometimes hostile environment, providing comfort and a sense of a shared 
community.  They set up organizations to provide services for the community and 
settled close together.  For example, “Hajj Taslim Ali, the imam at the East 
London Mosque, provided a variety of useful services for his 7,000 worshippers: 
he and his wife taught Arabic classes to local children, collected and distributed 
old clothes, looked after children if the mothers had to go to hospital and was an 
interpreter in the local police station and courts.”42  These types of social 
networks sprung up all over England.  These communities were likely the historic 
root of what is often referred to as Muslim ghettoes not just in England but across 
Europe today.  As one writer observed, 
The growing Muslim presence in Europe has tended to cluster 
geographically within individual states, particularly in industrialized, 
urban areas within clearly defined, if not self-encapsulated, poorer 
neighborhoods such as Berlin’s Kreuzberg district, London’s Tower 
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augmenting its visibility and impact yet circumscribing day-to-day 
contact with the general population.  Two-fifths of Muslims in the 
United Kingdom reside in the greater London area.”43   
So, while the separate communities today are viewed as a real problem 
and area of concern, the reason for this situation is both understandable and 
predictable based on the historic roots of migration in England and across 
Europe.   
This is very different than the experience in the United States with its 
Muslim minority community.  There appears to be a much greater sense of 
alienation among European Muslims than Muslims in the United States.  In the 
United States, Muslim migrants were significantly outnumbered by both 
Hispanics and non-Muslim Asians while in Europe they were the dominant 
immigrant group.44  More importantly, the first generation Muslim immigrants in 
Europe were largely working class while those in the United States were more 
likely to come from the middle class with a higher education level.  As Olivier Roy 
observed, “They (Muslims) tend to live in more or less ‘ethnic’ neighborhoods in 
Europe, but in the United States are more scattered.  In Europe most Muslims 
come from specific areas with historical ties to the host country, while the United 
States has no colonial past with any Muslim country.”45  These differences have 
resulted in very different experiences between the United States and Europe in 
responding to Muslim communities and have created far more challenging 
circumstances for the Europeans.   
Perhaps the biggest difference between the United States and Europe is a 
less recognized factor.  Europe is largely secular, even forcefully secular as in 
the case of France, while the United States still maintains a religious character to 
it.  As one article observed, “But in a country where the dollar bill proclaims trust 
in God and Bible study groups are held in the White House, the notion religion 
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might be a barrier to integration is inconceivable.  Simply put, Muslims feel more 
at home in God-fearing America than in Godless Europe.”46  This is not to say 
that Muslims experiences in America are perfect.  But, there are no subtle signals 
being sent that people must choose between their religious faith or citizenship.  
While England is not France, this is still an issue there.  The article pointed out 
an anecdote that is somewhat telling;   
Reform is all the harder, however, in an atmosphere where even 
Tony Blair, a devout Christian, is reluctant to publicly profess his 
faith.  In the run-up to the Iraq war, when a journalist asked about 
rumors that he prayed with Bush, the British prime-minister allowed 
his chief spin doctor to cut off the question with a blunt, ‘I’m sorry, 
we don’t do God.’47 
Another writer made a similar point, nothing that “public life is increasingly and 
aggressively secular.  In one revealing incident, Tony Blair was bullied by 
subordinates out of ending a television address on Iraq with the words ‘God 
Bless you.’”48  The point here is that there is a religious divide in Europe between 
the Muslims and the secular Europeans that is not as apparent in America.  This 
factor is certainly influencing integration efforts and helping to contribute to a 
sense of alienation from society by religious Muslims.         
While the number of immigrants coming from the former colonies has 
slowed down, the growth of the Muslim community in England has actually 
increased both in numbers and as a percentage of the overall population.  This is 
due to a number of factors.  One of these factors has been a large increase in 
asylum seekers and refugees who have come from all over the globe.49  The 
other primary factor, as alluded to earlier, has been largely demographic.  The 
                                            
46 Sandro Contenta, “Secular Europe’s fundamental test.” Toronto Star. 30 December 2006. 
http://www.thestar.com/article/166418. Accessed 8 June 2007.  
47 Contenta, “Secular Europe’s Fundamental Test.”  
48 John O’Sullivan. “The Not-So-Great Divorce: Multiculturalism and liberalism look toward 
splitting up.” National Review Online. 25 April, 2005. http://www.nationalreview.com. Downloaded 
21 October 2007. 
49 Doomernik. “Immigration, Multi-Culturalism and the Nation State.”: p. 1. 
 20
birth rates in these communities are very high compared to the birth rate across 
England in general.  Within the UK itself, close to 50% of all Muslims living there 
are British-born.50  So, the primary growth now is the natural growth of a vibrant 
minority community in a country whose overall population is rapidly declining at 
an alarming pace.  This is a trend that is being replicated across Europe and 
much of the developed world.  While the demographic growth of the minority 
community is also likely slowing, it is declining at a much slower pace than that of 
the ethnic Europeans and this will likely remain the case for the foreseeable 
future as England, along with nearly all of the European countries, grapple with 
how to reverse their precariously low birth rates.  As Mark Steyn observed,  
The single most important fact about the early twenty-first century is 
the rapid aging of almost every developed nation other than the 
United States: Canada, Europe, and Japan are getting old fast, 
older than any functioning society has ever been and faster than 
any has ever aged.  A society ages when its birth rate falls and it 
finds itself with fewer children and more grandparents.51 
The numbers are somewhat staggering.  Whereas you typically need about a 2.1 
total fertility rate to create population equilibrium, meaning that the population 
does not grow or decline, Europe’s overall rate is at 1.38, which is healthier than 
Japan’s which is at 1.32 and Russia’s which is at 1.14.52  It is against this 
demographic backdrop that the Muslim communities in Europe have grown so 
rapidly.  The demographic decline of the states has been a huge contributing 
factor, probably the biggest and in the long-run, probably the most significant and 
irreversible.  Critics might point out that these demographic numbers could 
change, arguing that the birth rates of the Muslim communities will also likely 
decline over time.  While this is true, there is no evidence that the numbers for 
the ethnic and secular European populations are rising and the decline in the 
numbers for the Muslim community will likely happen gradually.     
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B. THE SECULAR-RELIGIOUS DIVIDE 
The Muslim community in England did not identify strongly along religious 
lines during its early history.  In the 1960s, while the communities were now 
understood to be a permanent part of the states, the role of Islam itself had not 
yet been asserted within the public sphere.  The immigrants “were largely 
involved in secular political movements that spoke to their ethnic and national 
concerns (mostly related to developments ‘back home’ in Pakistan, Kashmir or 
Bangladesh) or specific problems encountered by immigrants in the UK.”53  A 
political form of Islam, one that was deeply concerned with how the community 
was governed, was yet to emerge in Europe.   
It was not until the 1980s and 1990s that there was a real shift to more 
religiously oriented politics which accompanied “a shift in the intellectual climate 
on the political left away from the traditional emphasis on class struggle and 
economic equality and towards a new politics of identity and group rights.”54  This 
made it politically advantageous for people to view themselves through the prism 
of their “separate” identity where they could make greater demands on the state.  
The chosen identity, the one that united a large portion of the minority 
community, was Islam.  As one study observed, “Whereas in the 1970s these 
organizations had campaigned largely around cross-cultural issues – police 
treatment, immigration laws, housing – by the mid 1980s, they had moved to new 
issues, such as the provision of halal meat in schools, faith education, positive 
images of ethnic groups and Islamic clothing.”55  This was also likely the natural 
evolution of communities that had grown in numbers and now had enough 
influence to make these demands.   
It was also the result of a generation gap in which the second generation 
of Muslims had higher expectations of society.  As Olivier Roy observed, 
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“Whatever the status of these immigrants, a clear generation gap divides the 
second generation, born and educated in Europe, from the first, in terms not only 
of culture and language but also of social expectations.”56  This generation is 
also much more religious than the first generation and notably more hostile 
towards British and European society as will be discussed below. 
C. THE MULTICULTURAL RESPONSE  
The evolution of multicultural policies in England somewhat paralleled the 
historical growth of these communities.  England first started addressing the 
issue in the 1960s when it first started becoming aware of the less than 
temporary influx of newcomers and immediately established a multicultural 
approach.  In 1968, then Home Secretary Roy Jenkins talked about the 
importance of integration of ethnic minorities defining it as “not a process of 
flattering uniformity but of cultural diversity, coupled with equal opportunity in an 
atmosphere of mutual tolerance.”57  It can be seen in Jenkins definitions that he 
conceived of a society that protected equal opportunity while allowing, and 
perhaps even encouraging, separate cultures.  It was a somewhat live and let 
live approach that cared little about the actually substance of each culture and 
paid little attention to how that culture was changing.  While this approach 
evolved over the next couple decades, Jenkins initial conception is close to what 
became reality in England.  As one report observed, “Some analysts assert that 
until recent, British policymakers had a ‘laissez-faire’ attitude toward integration 
that essentially consisted of not worrying about it; to the extent that the 
government was concerned with the issue, the focus was largely on promoting 
tolerance and discouraging discrimination.”58  While this is changing now, this 
initial conception of the multicultural state stood until recently.  This was 
somewhat different than the French approach which tended to follow a more 
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republican model where “belonging to society is predominantly defined as 
belonging to a political community.”59  Their approach was to try and force a form 
of cultural assimilation to, at the very least, the political culture of France. 
The “laissez-faire” multiculturalism of England appears to be changing into 
something much more active and in some cases restrictive, but it is debatable 
whether it is actually changing for the better or more as a random fire knee-jerk 
reaction to the recent terrorist attacks.  The UK has introduced new citizenship 
and English language requirements as well as focusing on “improving dialogue 
with Muslim communities and promoting moderate Islam; and tackling 
disadvantage and discrimination.  In addition, the British government is also 
seeking to strengthen law enforcement and security measures to curb Islamist 
extremism and root out terrorists.”60  These are all positive steps and seem to 
point to a realizing by the state that the “laissez-faire” approach was misguided.  
Citizenship study was also added to the national curriculum of secondary schools 
in 2002.61  The government has also been aggressive in attempting to build 
relationships with moderate Muslim groups to include “ministerial outreach to 
Muslim leaders, community organizations, and youth and student groups to 
discuss issues of concern, such as the UK’s policy toward Iraq and new anti-
terrorist security measures.”62  There are also positive steps on the economic 
front in tackling the economic disparity between Muslims and the overall 
population where the current unemployment numbers are 15% unemployment for 
Muslims compared to roughly 5% for the overall population.63  The government 
has targeted grants for minority community projects, set up centers of vocational  
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excellence and entrepreneurship in Muslim areas, and targeted other programs 
at improving Muslim housing access.  They have also targeted programs at 
improving scholastic achievement among Muslims.64   
So, it would be wrong to say that England has not reacted to the growth of 
radicalism.  It has taken some real positive steps on trying to correct the problem.  
These steps will be evaluated in chapter four against the backdrop of a couple 
multicultural theories.  But, in far too many instances, the English multicultural 
approach can best be characterized as a live and let live approach that is mostly 
passive. 
D. MULTICULTURALISM TODAY:  IS IT BREAKING DOWN? 
There are, of course, challenges inherent in adopting a live and let live 
multicultural approach.  One challenge is that the cultural practices that are 
allowed might be contrary to the values of the larger community.  This has 
surfaced in many cases on the treatment of women.  It is very easy for the 
government to ignore these issues in the interest of multiculturalism.  One report 
observed that multicultural policies “have often ignored the needs of less 
powerful sections of ethnic communities.  Organizations like the Muslim 
Women’s Network have argued that community leaders silence their own women 
and prevent the criminal justice system from tackling problems such as domestic 
violence, honor killings and forced marriages.”65  While these issues are certainly 
not common to any specific culture, many multiculturalists view these crimes as 
part of the culture and they have become alarmingly common within the minority 
communities.  It clearly appears that the government is less forceful in dealing 
with these issues in the minority communities as opposed to in the majority 
population and multiculturalism as it is currently implemented is likely a large part 
of the problem.  It provides far too convenient of an excuse for the government to 
ignore serious crimes.  In this sense, multiculturalism can breed a form of racism 
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that views certain crimes and behavior as being normative to a certain culture 
and thereby acceptable.  The attitude that is adopted can best be stated, “Hey, it 
is part of their culture.  Therefore, what right do we have to intervene?” In some 
cases, this attitude is not only wrong by assigning cultural practices to 
pathologies that have nothing to do with the culture, it is also an abdication of 
responsibility by the state to protect all of its citizens.   
In a sense, it also could create widespread pathologies within a 
community that otherwise would not have been present since the state is 
essentially sanctioning the acts by not intervening.  This further empowers the 
most radical members of that community, members who support some of these 
practices.  It can also help to normalize abhorrent behavior, putting a stamp of 
approval or at least a lack of a stamp of disapproval, on these activities.  Again, 
this most frequently appears as a response to issues involving the treatment of 
women but certainly can include other issues, such as the instigation of hatred 
towards certain groups.  If this is done in conjunction with the state treating the 
most radical voices and groups as the authentic representatives of the 
community, the damage is even worse.  Far too often, the most radical voices 
are assumed to be the most authentic voices of the community by the state and 
treated as such.  As Mark Steyn wryly noted,  
If there were a ‘moderate Muslim’ lobby – one that, say, believed 
that suicide bombing is always wrong, even against Israelis, or that 
supported the liberation of Iraq on grounds that the Iraq people are 
in favor of it – your average Western government would 
immediately be suspicious that such a group was not ‘authentically’ 
Muslim.  Whereas, if you oppose the occupation of Iraq and seek to 
justify the depravity of Hamas, you have instant credibility.66  
The point here is that the government can strengthen the hand of the radicals by 
treating them as the authentic representatives of the community while also  
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putting a stamp of approval on pseudo-cultural practices such as the ill treatment 
of women.  In a sense, the government is actively participating in the 
radicalization of the community. 
Interestingly, survey results have show that Muslims expect much more 
integration out of immigrant groups than the government expects.  A MORI 
survey was conducted in August 2005.  The results were interesting if not that 
surprising:  
90% of Muslims felt immigrants should be made to learn English 
(compared to 82% of the main public). 76% of Muslims said 
immigrants should be made to pledge their primary loyalty to 
Britain, compared to 73% of the main public.  76% of Muslims said 
immigrants should be made to pledge their primary loyalty to 
Britain, compared to 73% of the main public.  65% of Muslims 
believed that Imams should be made to preach in English – a much 
higher figure than 39% of the main public.  95% (compared to 96% 
nationally) said immigrants should accept the rights of women as 
equal citizens.67 
Again, the evidence is showing that at times the state and multiculturalists listen 
to the most radical and loudest voices and then prescribe a cultural practice 
based on that voice.  Behavior that is deemed acceptable and good by 5% of the 
Muslim population is then projected onto the minority population as a whole as a 
cultural practice.  This is how a behavior can be normalized and a diverse culture 
shaped into something far more monolithic and dangerous. 
A bigger problem is that multiculturalism appears to be heightening the 
sense of difference among the minority communities and actually encouraging 
them to see themselves as something apart and separate from the larger society.  
In other words, it is leading to tribalism in which the minority communities are 
actually encouraged to demand separate privileges and status based upon their 
minority status and to see themselves as something apart from the larger society.   
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In a sense, they are not being encouraged to integrate but are actually being 
encouraged by society to do just the opposite, to see themselves as victims that 
are apart from society with growing demands on society.  As a recent Policy 
Exchange report noted,  
It is not hard to convince people to see themselves as victims of 
society when they are rewarded for this view.  Encouraging these 
minority groups to view themselves as something apart from 
society can be dangerous if it is leading to feelings of alienation and 
hostility towards society.  Again, it also tends to empower the most 
radical members of the community who can assert their right to 
separate treatment and resources the loudest.68 
There is also the problem that these types of policies take a generally 
multicultural group and gradual create a single culture.  The result is that instead 
of having a truly multicultural society, England and other countries in Europe run 
the risk of creating a bicultural society, with two dominant cultures in competition 
with one another.  It fosters an us versus them mentality among both the ethnic 
European culture and the Muslim culture.  History has shown that bicultural 
societies are not the most stable of societies.  As one writer observed, “If there’s 
three, four, or more cultures, you can all hold hands and sing ‘We Are the World.’ 
But if there’s just two – you and the Other – that’s generally more fractious.  
Bicultural societies are among the least stable in the world, especially once it’s 
no longer quite clear who’s the majority and who’s the minority.”69  Most of the 
literature is already treating the problem as one in which two primary cultures are 
involved, a secular European culture and a Muslim culture.  As Zachary Shore 
observed in regards to the Van Gogh assassination in the Netherlands, “The 
Dutch case symbolized the social tensions mounting across Europe between a 
burgeoning young, religious Muslim population, on the one hand, and a fearful, 
secular ethnic European populace, on the other.”70  While nearly all of these 
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writers acknowledge the diversity of the Muslim community, the primary tension 
is seen as taking place between a secular European culture and a religious 
Muslim culture.  Considering the general instability of bicultural societies, policies 
intended to produce that result are somewhat shortsighted and dangerous.   
There is another problem that is not necessarily linked to multiculturalism 
but is a product of the European system.  It is one of the biggest challenges 
created by high levels of immigration and it is economic in nature due to the 
social welfare nature of the states.  European states guarantee all legal residents 
certain basic rights which in Europe have a large economic element that can be 
quite substantial and expensive.  As a United Nations reported noted, “Much like 
an insurance system, it is no great problem if a few individuals claim for 
compensation without having contributed their premiums over a long period of 
time.  If, however, their numbers are large at some point the system may not be 
able to shoulder the burden.”71  While the report does not recommend closing the 
doors on immigration, it is highlighting the burden that it can bring.  It goes on to 
note that human rights concerns are a critical consideration and that certain 
treaties prevent countries from stopping migration.  It argues, 
Those treaties prevent governments from closing the door on 
unsolicited immigration, even though at time attempts are made to 
keep the chink as small as possible.  In effect, immigration has 
become part and parcel of the modern world and will not cease until 
global economic integration and equality have been reached – and 
even then.72 
The point here is that this is a very real consideration for the European states 
who are facing an economic double-edged sword.  They need high levels of 
immigration to replace their declining population and provide money to support a 
rapidly aging population.  At the same time, they can not afford the economic 
claim on the system of large numbers of people who are not paying into the 
system.  Considering the high level of unemployment among the minority 
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communities, this is a massive problem with no easy way out.  The system can 
not be maintained based on the current demographic trends and likely will 
emerge as a major point of contention in the future, one in which the immigrant 
community plays a large role.  While this factor does not directly play into 
England’s multicultural policies, its effect is likely to be substantial enough that it 
must at least be considered.   
So, the question that remains somewhat unanswered is how has 
England’s multicultural policies worked to date?  Are they indeed breaking down?  
There are mixed results when looking at the data but the answer seems to be 
yes.  Clearly there are serious fissures starting to come to the surface.  It is 
important to point out at the start that not all of the data is negative.  For 
example, a recent survey revealed that “59% of Muslims would prefer to live 
under British law compared to 28% who would prefer sharia.”73  The problem is 
that survey results are very hard to interpret since it is hard to define what should 
be considered good versus bad numbers.  On the one hand, it is good that a 
majority of Muslims prefer British law but that number hides the fact that a much 
higher percentage, 37%, of 16-24 year olds prefer sharia.74  Again, this is the 
generation gap that is starting to become more apparent.  Nearly all of the survey 
results reveal that the younger Muslims, particularly those in the 16-24 year old 
range, are more religious and conversely more negative on British society than 
the older generations.   
These numbers are not that out of line with numbers throughout the rest of 
Europe.  The generation gap appears common to all of the states and the 
numbers on these questions line up fairly closely.  For example, Zachary Shore 
cited a survey of young Turkish-German Muslims who were all in their twenties 
and teens.  In the survey,  
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…almost one-third agreed that Islam must become the state 
religion in every country.  Even though they live in Europe, 56 
percent declared they should not adapt too much to Western ways 
but should instead live according to Islam….Perhaps most 
disturbing, just over one-third insisted that if it serves the Muslim 
community, then they are ready to use violence against 
nonbelievers.75   
If the statistics are to be believed, not only is an increasing number of Muslims, 
especially youths, actively resisting integration, they are accepting that violence 
against nonbelievers within the societies is justified.  These numbers are very 
similar to the numbers of the recent study done in England.  They are included 
here to underscore that the numbers in England are not an aberration but are in 
line with numbers across Europe.  None of the countries in Europe with large 
Muslim populations are seeing comparatively better results. 
Another interesting result from the United Kingdom study was that 84% of 
Muslims “believe they have been treated fairly in this (British) society.”76  Again, 
this is a surprisingly high number indicating that a very large percentage of 
Muslims, more than eight in ten, believe they have been treated fairly.  But, it is 
also disturbing that despite the fact that most Muslims believe their society has 
treated them fairly, a growing minority is ready to reject that society in favor of 
something else.  This seems to be somewhat paradoxical and calls into question 
the assumption of many that the radicalization is mostly in response to how they 
have been treated by the societies.  While this number may appear to be a 
positive indicator, it might be just the opposite since it challenges the idea that 
any strategy can truly be effective at changing attitudes and causing Muslims to 
buy into the society since they largely already feel their society has treated them 
well and still want to reject it.  This is reinforced by the similar numbers across 
European states, even though not all of the states have relied on multiculturalism 
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with some adopting other policies.  That said, it is difficult to conclude that the 
policies adopted do not have some effect of these numbers.   
While no policy can be perfect, clearly a policy that is resulting in around 
40% of young adults wanting to replace the legal and cultural framework with 
something entirely different is not working.  While the policy framework is likely 
only one factor in this high number, it is still likely a factor.  As the authors who 
were trying to make sense of the sometimes conflicting poll results observed, 
“There is clearly a moderate majority that accepts the norms of Western 
democracy and a growing minority that does not.”77  Considering how fast this 
minority is growing and the influence it wields, this is a cause for concern.  In 
fact, it may be approaching crisis levels. 
 Commenting on another survey, a July 7, 2006 survey by the Times of 
London, a year after the Tube bombings, in which 16 percent of Muslims 
surveyed said the cause was right and 7 percent agreed that suicide attacks on 
civilians in the United Kingdom are justified, Mark Steyn observed, 
If this is a war, then that is a substantial fifth column.  There are, 
officially, one million Muslims in London, half of them under twenty-
five.  If 7 percent think suicide attacks on civilians are justified, 
that’s 70,000 potential supporters in Britain’s capital city…As 
September 11 demonstrated, you only have to find nineteen stout-
hearted men, and from a talent pool of 70,000 that’s not bad odds.  
Besides, a large majority of Western Muslims support almost all the 
terrorists’ strategic goals: according to one poll, over 60 percent of 
British Muslims want to live under sharia in the United Kingdom.  
Another poll places the percentage who favor ‘hard-line’ sharia at a 
mere 40 percent…Another poll found that 20 percent of British 
Muslims sympathized with the ‘feelings and motives’ of the July 7 
London Tube bombers.  Or, more accurately, 20 percent were 
prepared to admit to a pollster they felt sympathy, which suggests 
the real figure might be somewhat higher.78 
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These poll results suggest the problem has already moved beyond crisis level.  
One poll may be an aberration but nearly all of the polls are in agreement on the 
general trends.  So, while it is possible to find some silver linings in the poll 
results, one has to look very hard to find them. 
There is a growing body of evidence that England is not faring much better 
than their counterparts on the continent in integrating their Muslim population 
despite the almost universal belief within England that this is the case.  While a 
higher percentage of the United Kingdom’s Muslims may feel they have been 
treated fairly by their society, the rest of the numbers and evidence simply do not 
support this belief.  A recent study by the Pew Center, among other studies, 
reveals that this is a flawed view.  As the study noted in assessing how Muslims 
in the countries view westerners,  
While publics in largely Muslim countries generally view Westerners 
as violent and immoral, this view is not nearly as prevalent among 
Muslims in France, Spain and Germany.  British Muslims, however, 
are the most critical of the four minority public studied – and they 
come closer to the view of Muslims around the world in their 
opinions of Westerners.79 
Again, as with all survey results, it is worth approaching these results with 
caution.  It is possible that because of England’s multicultural policies and more 
active acceptance, Muslims in England feel freer to express their true feelings 
without fear of reprisals.  While this would be bad news for the rest of Europe, it 
would help to explain what appear to be somewhat paradoxical results.  It is also 
possible that England’s close relationship with the United States, a nation that is 
very unpopular in much of the Muslim world, at this point in history has muddied 
the picture.  But, even if this were the case, it is worth noting that this link is often 
overplayed.  For example, the Madrid attacks that are typically linked to Spain’s 
support of the United States were already being planned in 2000-2001, long 
before that link existed.  So, while it may be the case that some of the negative 
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attitudes have grown in response to England’s close friendship to the United 
States, it is impossible to say so with certainty.  Evidence does support that the 
Iraq War has had an effect on recruiting across Europe but it is equally clear that 
radicalization of most of Europe’s Muslims started long before the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq that 
followed it.  It is not the simple cause and effect relationship that some would like 
to make it for political reasons.   
One possible, even likely, explanation for the surprising survey results that 
indicate that the United Kingdom may actually be in worse shape in regards to its 
minority population is multiculturalism itself.  The complete tolerance of even the 
most radical preachers appears to have opened the door to the growth of 
radicalism. Ironically, while France is often viewed as the most negative example 
of integration when it comes to its minority community, its policies appear to have 
been much more effective in curbing some of the worst of the extremism.  They 
have been far less complacent than their counterpart across the channel and 
their counterparts on the continent.  As Robert Leiken observed, 
France is the exception to general European complacency.  Well 
before September 11, France had deployed the most robust 
counterterrorism regime of any Western country…To prevent 
proselytizing among its mostly North African Muslim community, 
during the 1990s the energetic French state denied asylum to 
radical Islamists even while they were welcomed by its neighbors.  
Fear, as Kepel put it, that contagion would turn ‘the social malaise 
felt by Muslims in the suburbs of major cities ‘into extremism and 
terrorism, the French government cracked down on jihadists, 
detaining suspects for as long as four days without charging them 
or allowing them access to a lawyer.  Today no place of worship is 
off limits to the police in secular France.  Hate speech is rewarded 
with a visit from the police, blacklisting, and the prospect of 
deportation.  These practices are consistent with the strict Gallic 
assimilationist model that bars religion from the public sphere.80     
It is likely that Leiken is painting a little bit overly optimistic picture of France’s 
effectiveness in handling the growth of radical Islam.  After all, the torching of 
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cars has become something of a national pastime among its minority community 
as a way to express their anger at the government.  The long-term effect of 
policies that seek to entirely bar religion from the public sphere also seems likely 
to be negative.  That social malaise mentioned by Leiken is very real and will 
likely continue to bubble to the surface despite the best anti-terrorism policies in 
the world.  These policies mentioned above do next to nothing to confront this 
feeling of hopelessness and alienation.  But the point that France’s more 
aggressive and less tolerant policies have done more to curb the worst excesses 
of radical Islam compared to England’s more tolerant and open multicultural 
policies is one worth considering.  Leiken continues,  
Contrast the French approach to the United Kingdom’s separatist 
form of multiculturalism, which offered radical Arab Islamists refuge 
and the opportunity to preach openly, while stepping up 
surveillance of them.  French youth could still tune into jihadist 
messages on satellite television and the Internet, but in the United 
Kingdom open radical preaching spawned terrorist cells.  Most of 
the rest of Europe adopted the relaxed British approach, but with 
less surveillance.81   
Indeed, England’s approach does seem to be allowing, if not actually 
encouraging, a real growth in the number of terrorist cells.  It provided the space 
and protection for radical Islam to flourish and expand as an ideology. 
It is becoming increasingly common to open the newspaper to read about 
a terrorist cell in England that was planning an attack either domestically or 
internationally.  While most people are aware of the terrorist attacks on the 
London subways, they are less aware of just how many attacks have been 
thwarted.  In March 2004, London police seized a huge cache of bomb making 
materials while unraveling a plot by nine British nationals of Pakistani origin.  
Then, a few months later, they charged eight more immigrants with assembling a 
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dirty bomb.82  The good news is that England’s law enforcement apparatus has 
been very successful in stopping the attacks.  At the beginning of the year, there 
were about 100 people awaiting trial on terror-related charges in England.83  The 
bad news is that considering the growth of cells and the growing radicalization of 
its minority community, successful attacks are inevitable and considering the 
growing social base of support and funding, some of these attacks could be 
catastrophic whether they are carried out against the United Kingdom or planned 
in the United Kingdom and carried out elsewhere.  The growing social base may 
also make it more and more difficult for British authorities to thwart future attacks.  
British intelligence believes there are 1,600 people who “are actively engaged in 
promoting attacks at home and abroad.”84  Considering the survey results, this 
number is probably much higher but even if it was not, that is still a fairly robust 
and organized group of people actively promoting terrorism from within England, 
one that is likely to grow based on the survey numbers. 
E. MULTICULTURALISM GOING FORWARD:  CAN IT BE ADAPTED TO 
MEET THE CHALLENGES OF TODAY? 
The bottom line appears to be that both survey results and anecdotal 
evidence do not indicate England is doing better than nations on the continent 
who supposedly, at least in the eyes of many British policy makers and 
commentators, have much less open and progressive policies than England.  
The current form of multiculturalism is not only not working, it is likely causing 
much of the problem.  Other nations in Europe that are also using a multicultural 
approach, like the Netherlands, are facing similar problems.  It is also notable 
that far more terrorists appear to be spawning in these countries than anywhere 
else in the world, to include some of the most authoritarian Arab states who do 
not provide the same safe space for radical Islam to flourish.  By any measure, 
Europe is becoming a hotbed of terrorist planning and England may very well be 
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the epicenter of it based on the numbers.  The British multicultural model, when 
compared to the models even of other western nations, appears to be potentially 
the worst failure, especially considering the high hopes that were invested into it. 
Leiken contrasts the various approaches to Muslim immigrants on the 
head scarf issue by observing, “The French ban the headscarf in public schools; 
the Germans ban it among public employees.  The British celebrate it.  The 
Americans tolerate it.”  In his view, the Americans may be striking the best 
balance.  He concludes,  
Given the United States’ comparatively happier record of 
integrating immigrants, one may wonder whether the mixed U.S. 
approach – separating religion from politics without placing a wall 
between them, helping immigrants slowly adapt but allowing them 
relative cultural autonomy—could inspire Europeans to chart a new 
course between an increasingly hazardous multiculturalism and a 
naked secularism that estranges Muslims and other believers.  One 
thing is certain…Europe needs to develop an integration policy that 
works.  But that will not happen overnight.85   
One thing that is interesting in Leiken’s suggestion is that he is rejecting 
multiculturalism and then suggesting that it be replaced with a different form of 
multiculturalism.  On this point, I agree.  Most people in the United Kingdom are 
not ready to throw out multiculturalism, nor should they.  A survey commissioned 
by the BBC after the 2005 bombings indicated that “62% of the general public 
and 87% of Muslims still held favorable views of multiculturalism, believing that it 
made Britain a better place to live and that it should not be jettisoned.”86  Based 
on this survey data, multiculturalism still commands respect and support among 
the entire population.  While this might be blind faith, it is also possible that within 
this data may be the recognition that for all of its problems to date, 
multiculturalism in some form is likely the only solution.  So, the key is to adapt it 
in a way that will enable the European state to both actively combat terrorism 
                                            
84 Contenta, “Secular Europe’s Fundamental Test.”   
85 Leiken, “Europe’s Angry Muslims,” p. 7. 
86 Gallis, Muslims in Europe: p. 13. 
 37
while not further breeding radicalism.  This likely holds the best hope for success 
in Europe.  While France may have been heralded for its aggressive policies at 
rooting out terrorism by some within the literature, their almost militant secularism 
will undermine these efforts in the long run.  France is not unlikely to be a long-
term success story without significantly adopting its own philosophical and policy 
framework.  England is clearly doing some things right.  They have stopped a 
host of attacks with speaks well to their monitoring efforts.  But, clearly the rapid 
growth of radical Islam within its borders is cause for huge concern.  This likely 
will be England’s greatest challenge for the foreseeable future. 
The key at this point is to identify a form of multiculturalism that 
accomplishes a number of goals.  First and foremost, it must lead to greater 
integration and a feeling of connectedness with society while allowing room for 
cultural differences.  It must also allow for the state to actively combat the 
radicalism that already exists.  The next chapter will look at some of the theories 
on multiculturalism with the hope of identifying some elements of different 
approaches that could help England improve its current approach. 
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III. THEORIES OF MULTICULTURALISM 
The term multiculturalism has become a somewhat ubiquitous term over 
the past couple decades as a way to describe relations between different 
ethnic/religious/cultural groups within a society.  Yet the actual meaning of the 
term can sometimes seem cloudy with different people meaning different things 
when they use the term.  The basic definition is “an ideology advocating that 
society should consist of, or at least allow and include, distinct cultural and 
religious groups, equal status.”87  Another writer argues that “multiculturalism 
rests on the supposition – or better, the dishonest pretense – that all cultures are 
equal and that no fundamental conflict can arise between the customs, mores, 
and philosophical outlooks of two different cultures.”88  The assumption does 
indeed seem to be present in most of the literature on multiculturalism, that 
cultures should be treated as having inherently equal value.  The potential 
conflict between those values is largely glossed over.   
It is often used to describe deliberate policies of a state but can also be 
used to simply describe the existence of multiple cultures within a state.  As one 
book observed and asked in 1996, “The term ‘multiculturalism has become 
current in the last five years, but little has been resolved about its meaning and 
effects.  Why does multiculturalism still produce so much simultaneous rejection, 
ambivalence, and interest?  How do its meaning vary?”89  A decade later, these 
same questions are still being asked.  Another writer put it this way, 
Multiculturalism is one of those ‘plastic words’, fit for the casting of 
new models….After having been processed by science, it has 
traversed a range of social sectors, where it becomes implemented 
in the creation of a new reality.  It represents one of those new 
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world-wide floating concepts, which, traveling from continent to 
continent, are ‘communicated easily and quickly to sometimes 
unexpected recipients with sometimes surprising results.’90 
The key here is that the definition changes based on who is positing it or where it 
is being used.  In many ways, in its usage it has come mean both everything, and 
because of that, nothing.  In that, the word multiculturalism is not unlike the term 
globalization in that both have expanded to mean so much since originally put 
forth that they frequently mean nothing at all, just an all-expansive concept that 
can mean anything the person saying it or hearing it want it to mean.  It has also 
become a politically charged term that can carry certain connotations depending 
on who is using it.   
Despite the ubiquity of its use in the political dialogue today, it is a 
relatively recent term that traces its roots back no further than the 1970s where it 
was used, and named, as a political strategy in Canada.91 From there, it rapidly 
spread to the United States, Europe, and Australia.      
As indicated in the introduction, multiculturalism is defined here as the 
specific policies aimed at supporting or integrating different cultures within a 
society with the goal of social cohesion and respect between cultural groups.  
That is the primary goal of most of the countries employing it as a strategy.  
Moving beyond the philosophical definitions to a policy framework with a specific 
strategy is the greater challenge.  Within the policy realm, there is much 
disagreement as to what actually constitutes multiculturalism or what it should 
look like in practice.  
A. DIFFERENTIATED CITIZENSHIP 
One theory on how multiculturalism should be applied is through the 
establishment of a differentiated citizenship within the state meaning that 
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different groups are granted different rights and privileges.  At one time, this was 
the dominant idea within the literature even if it was not usually called 
differentiated citizenship.  This idea likely traces its origin back to Charles 
Taylor’s pivotal essay “The Politics of Recognition.”  As Taylor argued, 
The politics of difference is full of denunciations of discrimination 
and refusals of second-class citizenship.  This gives the principle of 
universal equality a point of entry within the politics of dignity.  But 
once inside, as it were, its demands are hard to assimilate to that 
politics.  For it asks that we give acknowledgement and status to 
something that is not universally shared.  Or, otherwise put, we give 
due acknowledgement only to what is universally present – 
everyone has an identity – through recognizing what is peculiar to 
each.  The universal demand powers an acknowledgement of 
specificity.92   
Taylor starts with the belief that, until proven otherwise, all cultures have 
value and are worthy or recognition.  They should be treated with dignity and, in 
order for that to happen, they should be accorded rights that allow them to 
maintain their cultural practices.  Taylor believed it important that separate 
culture groups be protected and advanced by the state.   
This is the baseline belief for differentiated citizenship.  Out of this springs 
the idea that “it is possible to define a complex model of citizenship based upon a 
dual system of rights, namely ‘a general system of rights which are the same for 
all, and a more specific system of group-conscious policies and rights.”93  
Essentially, differentiated citizenship is advocating that people within a society 
should be treated differently based upon their unique cultures.  Differentiated 
citizenship advocates that citizens within a state should potentially be granted 
different rights in accordance with their cultural demands in addition to those 
rights that are common to everyone.  One can see where this can be problematic 
among the western democracies in that it can potentially be viewed as a threat to 
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equality within the society, a value that many hold to be the highest ideal within a 
society.  In a differentiated citizenship multicultural system, all people are not 
being treated equally since some are being granted rights that are not given to 
others.  Members of certain cultural groups would be accorded rights and 
privileges that are not extended to the overall population.   
With this in mind, policies would need to be created and adapted that are 
not viewed as a threat to equality within a society.  This means that one group 
should not be made to feel that they are less equal because of the rights or 
privileges given to a certain cultural group or instead of producing more social 
harmony, it would run the risk of doing just the opposite. 
However, the differentiated citizenship idea is not unprecedented and 
there are some rather mundane examples of these types of rights, such as 
“exemptions from mandatory schooling laws for the Amish in the United States or 
motorcycle helmet laws for Sikhs in England.”94  So, while it may sound like a 
dangerous concept, its application can be anything but dangerous.  Properly 
applied, it can simply be a way to grant cultural protection to certain groups that, 
because of their cultural or religious beliefs, need certain exemptions or added 
rights that can not be granted to the entire population.  An important question to 
consider, then, is, “when should separate rights be given and what form should 
they take?” 
As Matteo Gianni notes, 
There are two types of cultural rights which seem to me necessary 
in order to improve political and social integration.  The first one 
consists in granting particular rights to some groups, thus allowing 
them to realize their conception of the good.  The purpose of these 
groups should be integrated despite their cultural difference, in the 
name of liberal tolerance…The second situation concerns groups 
which are marginalized or…oppressed by the dominant cultural 
majority.  In this case, the main goal is not to obtain ‘external 
protections’ but to achieve true integration into the community.95 
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He is arguing that the rights or privileges that are given should serve to enable a 
cultural group to live according to their beliefs and to integrate into the overall 
community without threatening that overall community. 
The challenge is to determine which rights are accorded to which groups.  
This is no easy matter since the overall goal of equality within society would need 
to be maintained and also because most groups are very diverse in and of 
themselves.  Some rights or privileges will not threaten this balance.  For 
example, one would be hard pressed to find people in the United States who feel 
a sense of inequality because the Amish have a right to educate their own school 
children in accordance with their religious beliefs.  However, if a cultural group 
was given the right to not pay any taxes to the state based upon a cultural belief, 
a clear sense of inequality would exist.   
There is also the danger of “rights” given to groups turning into restrictions 
within that group, allowing for the cultural group to enforce uniformity on 
members who do not wish to exercise that “right.”  In a sense, the extra right 
given to a cultural group would instead become a restriction enforced by that 
group on its own members.  In that way, the right would serve not to improve 
every member of that community’s ability to meet their conception of the good 
but would actually hamper it.  As Gianni notes, “I believe that a differentiated 
citizenship should entail an enrichment of rights for the individual, but never a 
diminution of those rights due to membership in a cultural group.”96  That must 
remain a key in determining which rights would be accorded to groups.  Those 
rights should never serve to actually dilute freedom of people within that group in 
practice.  Any rights or special recognition that is accorded a group should in no 
way threaten the basic rights of citizenship within that state.  While this may 
sounds obvious, it is a real danger as can be seen by the reluctance of European 
states to protect women within the minority communities out of fear of interfering 
with a “culturally approved” practice. 
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Another danger in applying differentiated citizenship in practice would be 
in treating cultural groups as homogenous groups when they may very well be 
quite diverse.  Again, the danger is extending rights based on the cultural 
practices of a small minority of the cultural group, probably the loudest minority, 
onto the entire cultural group or in according special status to part of a cultural 
group at the expense of the overall cultural group.   
B. SPHERE THEORIES 
Another model that helps to define how multiculturalism can be applied 
was first articulated by the social philosopher Hannah Arendt who developed a 
model that divided society into three spheres, the public, social and private 
spheres.97  Within the public sphere, that sphere where political cohesion is 
produced, “equality among individuals is the defining principle.”98  So, all citizens 
are engaged on equal terms within this sphere regardless of any differences in 
culture or religion.  Examples of equal rights in this sphere would be the right to 
vote or the right to own property or the responsibility to pay taxes to the state.  
The key term here is equality meaning that all citizens are equal under the law 
and share equal rights within the state.  The legal framework that defines how 
people should act within the public and political realm, in Arendt’s model, should 
be common to everyone. 
The social sphere is a little bit harder to define but is “a space no longer 
private but not yet political where most of society’s activities activity takes place, 
where goods are produced and traded, and where capital is being 
transformed.”99 In other words, it is the economic realm.  Arendt allows that 
“since competition is permitted, a certain amount of discrimination is inevitable 
while the state, at best, undertakes to contain some of its more detrimental 
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effects.” 100  The role of the state in this sphere is to eliminate “starting level 
inequalities.”101  So, there may be some differentiation between different cultural 
groups within this sphere by the state to achieve the goal of curtailing 
discrimination or the removal of barriers that might cause inequality.  Still, the 
state has only a minor role in this sphere. 
Arendt’s private sphere is somewhat self-explanatory.  It is “characterized 
by the protection it extends to human qualities that could not survive in public, 
such as intimacy, trust, goodness – qualities, in other words, which are 
indispensable to the mutually supportive creation of meaning and 
communitarization.”102  This sphere contains everything that is not explicitly 
covered in the other two spheres.  Anything that is not overtly related to 
economic activity in the social sphere or the states’ duty to provide equal political 
opportunity within the public sphere falls into the private sphere.  The guiding 
principle here is that the “state has no right to intervene in the private sphere of 
its citizens, unless constitutional laws are being violated.”103  The bottom line for 
the government is that it should stay out of this sphere.  This might mean that 
“communitarizations occurring in this space may be determined by class, 
religious or ethnic criteria and may lead to the exclusion of third parties.  The 
private sphere thus stand for both the principle of integration as well as the 
principle of exclusion.”104  But, since it is the private sphere and outside the 
jurisdiction of the government, this is acceptable within the theory.  
For Arendt, the three spheres must maintain their separate function.  Any 
crossing between them would lead to problems within society.  As Wicker points 
out,  
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Moving the principle of equality from the public-political sphere to 
the social would restrict competition and ultimately lead to social 
paralysis.  If the same principle were to be expanded further to the 
private level, the state would assume totalitarian traits.  Conversely, 
if the exclusion of certain groups is tolerated on the social level, 
competition and social progress is in jeopardy.  Allowing the 
principle of exclusion to function in the public-political sphere would 
constitute a a serious breach of the principle of equality; to tolerate 
a politics based on ethnic prejudice – as we might say today – 
would ultimately undermine the constitutional state.105 
Because of the negative effects caused by allowing the specific characteristics of 
each sphere to overflow into another sphere, it was of vital importance to Arrendt 
to maintain very clear boundaries between the three spheres. 
This has a more important implication for multiculturalism than appears on 
first glance.  The primary tensions in arguing about multiculturalism tend to occur 
between universalists and particularists within the social sciences and 
humanities.  As Wicker notes,  
What is striking about this debate in the present context, is the 
incompatibility of the respective positions of those who promote a 
wide-ranging relativism and multiculturalism (Rex, 1986; Taylor, 
1992) and those who perceive multiculturalism as an unpardonable 
betrayal of the principles and values of the enlightenment – all men 
are equal – (Finkielkraut, 1987; Radtke, 1990), and who therefore 
insist on a strictly universalist politics.  Arguing from Arendt’s 
perspective one is inclined to point out that it depends on where a 
particular human activity takes place if one is to assess whether 
universalist or particularist action makes sense and thus deserves 
to be protected.106 
So, despite its rigidities, Arendt’s theory on spheres provided a framework to 
bridge the gap between the two main sides in the debate on multiculturalism.  In 
Arendt’s view, it all depended upon which sphere an activity takes place within 
whether it makes more sense to adopt a universalist or particularist position.  For 
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Arendt, both universalism and particularism have important functions depending 
on the sphere.  Universalism must reign supreme in the public realm while 
particularism should be the guiding principle in the private realm.  The social 
realm bridges both principles.   
John Rex was likely building on Arrendt’s ideas with his theory of two 
domains, the public and the private.  He essentially eliminates Arrendt’s social 
sphere which makes sense since it is somewhat esoteric and can be easily 
incorporated within the other two spheres.  His writings, while clearly similar, are 
much more specifically focused on the issue of multiculturalism than were those 
of Arrendt.   
Rex essentially envisions four types of society based upon the interplay of 
these two domains, the public and the private, with regards to the treatment of 
minorities.107  As Rex wrote about the different types of societies, 
There appears then to be four possibilities: 
A. One might envisage a society which is unitary in the public 
domain but which encourages diversity in what are thought as 
private and communal matters. 
B. A society might be unitary in the public domain and also enforce 
or at least encourage unity of cultural practice in private or 
communal matters. 
C. A society might allow diversity and differential rights for groups in 
the public domain and also encourage or insist upon diversity of 
cultural practice by different groups. 
D. A society might have diversity and differential rights in the public 
domain even though there is considerable unity of cultural practice 
between groups.108 
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Under this model as presented by Rex, model (a) is representative of a society 
which encourages equality of opportunity while (b) is representative of an ideal of 
assimilation of minority rights, perhaps following the French model.109  The other 
two models are presented in far more negative light with model (c) essentially 
representing the colonial system and the South African apartheid system and 
model (d) used as an example of the Deep South in the United States prior to the 
Civil Rights movement.110    
This theory lines up very nicely with Arrendt’s earlier writings.  The type (a) 
society is actually seeking universalism in the public domain while allowing for 
particularism in the private domain.  This approaches the ideal that Arrendt was 
seeking.  The second model, represented as model (b) seeks to establish 
equality across the board and has, as an ideal, a monocultural state.  The society 
represented as type (c) would seek particularism in both domains allowing for 
separate group rights or a recognition of ethnic differences in both domains.  This 
would apply particularism across the board and would, in Arrendt’s view, be a 
threat to the equality in the public domain which is so important.  Type (d) is likely 
the most insidious of the models since the culture in the private domain is 
essentially the same but differences are enforced in the public domain.  This 
would be present in a state that enforces some form of discrimination against a 
certain ethnic or religious group in the public or political sphere.   
Rex defines the public domain as including “institutions of law, politics and 
the economy” while relegating “matters relating to the family, to morality and 
religion” as belonging in the private domain.111  But, when looking at these 
categories, one can clearly see that a hard barrier can not be drawn between 
them.  In some cases, matters of law are also matters relating to the family or 
morality.  There is also the possibility that a religious practice might directly 
violate a legal institution or prevent active participation within the economic 
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system.  Even apart from that, the state clearly has interests which compel is to 
intervene in what Rex defines as the private sphere.  For example, in the interest 
of order, the state might choose to foster programs that strengthen the institution 
of the family.  This would clearly be an intrusion into the private realm but for 
some states, such as Japan or the European states with precariously low fertility 
rates, this might also be a matter of national survival.  Another obvious example, 
one that Rex readily acknowledges is education which clearly serves to not only 
provide needed skills but also to transmit moral values.112  Rex believes that 
these barriers can be overcome.  Discussing education, he argues,  
Once we recognize the inherent tensions to be found in the 
educational system, because it is at once part of the public and 
private domain it is possible to envisage a balance of control.  The 
school should be concerned as the agent of the public domain with 
selection, with the transmission of skills and with what we have 
called here the civic morality.  The community should control 
education in all matters having to do with their own language, with 
religion and with family affairs.  In a multicultural state, the state 
should provide financial support for this.113 
While this provides an answer to the problem presented by an area where there 
is clear overlap between the public and the private, it is not without its own 
shortcomings.  For one thing, it assumes a certain level of homogeneity within 
the community so that it can direct its own affairs.  This is in line with an 
argument one sees against multiculturalism that it treats minority groups as a 
monolithic block.  For example, many within that community might want 
education to be in English while others might want it to be in a different language.  
So, while Rex’s theory is not without its shortcomings, it does provide a good 
structural framework from which to examine a state’s multicultural policies and 
practices.   
Another potential problem here is on the other side of the equation, those 
cultural groups that are being afforded freedom and protection within the private 
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realm while being treated equally within the public realm.  Islam provides an 
interesting case study in that it is an inherently political religion.  Many of its 
practitioners will not be satisfied by a system that attempts to push religious 
practice out of the public realm and only into the private realm.  For some, the 
very idea of a democratic system is an affront to their religious beliefs.  Another 
example would be freedom of speech.  While freedom of speech might be 
encouraged as a universal freedom within the public domain, Muslims might not 
accept that this freedom includes the right to criticize Islam as was apparent in 
the Danish cartoon fiasco.  So, although the theory provides an interesting 
framework for the application of multicultural policies, it does come with some 
challenges that would have to be overcome for both the state and the cultural 
groups.  Rex was not blind to these challenges and understood that some give 
and take would have to take place between the state and cultural groups within 
that state. 
Rex does apply his theory to England in an attempt to see how applicable 
it is to the situation in which the primary cultural group is a Muslim minority.  The 
key question for him is “how far British people and their politicians on the one 
hand and Muslim minorities on the other are willing to accept the ‘two domains’ 
thesis and what they would see as falling within each domains.”114  This must 
first be addressed before determining if the theory has any validity for the British 
experience.   
Rex believes that the British demand for a shared public culture extends 
beyond simple equal opportunity, which was initially posited in 1968 by then 
Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, and would also include loyalty to the state and 
acceptance of political democracy as the form of government.115  These 
demands have intensified since the 9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks.  More 
problematic, they would, according to Rex, also demand a “privileged position of 
aspects of British culture, including the role of the Established church and of 
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primarily Christian education in schools.”116  They would also likely question 
some of the practices within the Muslim communities that they viewed as 
infringing on the rights of women.117  So, one can see at the outset that there will 
be some problems in what each side views as the shared public culture based on 
the views of the majority of British citizens. 
There are also likely challenges on the Muslim side.  Rex acknowledges 
that most Muslims would reject the two domains theory out of hand, arguing that 
Islam is a way of life that can not be divided and put into a single domain.118  The 
very idea of a two domains theory would be insulting.  They would also likely 
argue that there are some situations in which their loyalty to the Ummah 
supercedes loyalty to the state.  They would also likely see their communal ways 
as something that should be adopted across the entire society.119  As Rex noted, 
“They would demand the right not merely to practice their religion and to have 
that practice taught in schools, but to have it protected against blasphemous 
attacks; some also would argue for the ideal of an Islamic state.”120  Based upon 
recent opinion polls of both sides of the issue that were highlighted earlier, Rex’s 
analysis at this point is on the mark.  All of these challenges are manifesting 
themselves in England. 
Rex does not believe any of the difficulties are nearly as problematic as 
they may appear on first glance.121  Rex argues that Muslims are indeed loyal to 
the state and while acknowledging that problems could arise if Britain went to war 
against an Islamic state, these problems would not be that overwhelming.122  The 
Iraq War put this contention to the test.  It does indeed appear to have triggered 
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a rise in radicalism within the Muslim community and clearly many within that 
community viewed British participation in it as an attack on Islam.  The attitudes 
in the survey earlier are a real cause for alarm but it is difficult to assess how 
much of that can be attributed to the Iraq War since the attitudes of other 
European Muslims, particularly younger men, in countries that chose not to 
participate in the war is not markedly different than those in England.  The 
question of political loyalty remains at the heart of the debate and it can not be 
shrugged off quite as easily as Rex attempts to dismiss it.  The question of 
whether one can have their first loyalty to a separate religious community and 
then be secondarily loyal to a political community is really the key question.  The 
answer to this question is almost certainly yes based upon the American 
experience in which members of various religious communities, while extremely 
loyal to their religious community, are some of the most patriotic Americans.  But, 
it remains unclear in England where there are essentially two dominant 
communities whether this dynamic can play out in the same way. 
The next question for Rex is the question of democracy.  In this case, he 
appears to turn to Turkey, without specifically naming Turkey, as a key example 
of how the question should be handled.  Rex argues, “If there were an Islamic 
party which announced that if victorious it would suspend further elections, that 
party would have to be banned as other anti-democratic parties have been.”123  
The key concern then is the defense of democracy at all costs, even if it means 
overturning the result of a legitimate election.  Rex does not believe this will 
come to pass arguing that his belief is that “faced with the need to make their 
views clear in the British situation they (Islamic party such as Jamaat-i-Islami) 
would be very pragmatic, as they have been in dealing with political situations in 
other democratic countries.”124  When analyzing this concern, it is important to 
think long-term as opposed to short-term.  Rex does not seem to be considering 
the long-term challenges this would create.  In the short-term, this is not that big 
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of a concern.  In the long-term, as demographic trends result in the Muslim 
minority community growing even as the rest of the population shrinks, it may 
find itself in the position to win national elections.  In this event, canceling the 
result of an election or suspending a political party will not be something that can 
be done without a tremendous social cost, even the specter of civil war.  That 
said, in terms of the various challenges in aligning the various spheres, this 
appears to rank relatively low.  This worst case scenario is a long way off and 
based on assumptions that may never come to pass.  But it is a worst case 
scenario for a reason, because it would likely precede the breakdown of the 
state.  So it must not be completely overlooked.  In looking at Islamist parties 
around the world, it appears that becoming involved in the political process 
serves as a moderating influence so even the most radical Islamist parties in 
England would likely moderate their views with the acquisition of political power. 
A bigger issue of confrontation may be on the nature of whether or not 
England is a secular state.  Rex argues that Britain is not a secular state since “it 
has an Established Church whose Archbishop crowns the Queen.  The Queen is 
declared to be the ‘Supreme Governor’ of that church, and Christianity has a 
privileged place in the schools.”125  There is also a law that protects the Church 
of England from blasphemy.126  While England may indeed still have an official 
church, this hardly means that the state is not secular.  Just as the queen is 
nothing more than a figurehead, the official church is little more than a historic 
artifact at this point.  England is a secular state with some trappings of a past 
religious history.  Even Rex acknowledges that “the position of the Anglican 
Church is really only a theoretical one and that in the past two hundred years it 
has come to be expected that other religions will, in fact, be tolerated.”127  That 
fact is that Islam is far more influential in England today than Christianity.  While 
there may appear to be a double standard in regards to the blasphemy law, it is 
                                            




hard to imagine anybody in England being prosecuted for speaking out against 
Christianity.  The apparent blasphemy double standard came to light because of 
the Salmon Rushdie affair in which the Muslim community was unified in 
demanding that the book The Satanic Verses be banned.  The book triggered 
protests in many British towns, especially Bradford.     
Still, appearances matter.  To the Muslim population, the privileged 
position of the Anglican Church and the potential double standard on the 
blasphemy law are problematic.  It creates a feeling of second class citizenship.  
On the blasphemy issue, there are a couple possible answers.  Either England 
can strike the law against blasphemy against the Anglican Church from the 
books or extend protection against blasphemy to all religions, including Islam.  
The far better option, considering the secular nature of the state, is the first 
option in which all religions are subject to criticism.  Rex prefers the second 
option arguing, “What Rushdie’s book does infringe is the not often considered 
third principle involved in (Roy) Jenkin’s definition of integration, namely that of 
mutual tolerance.”128  The problem is that there is a fine line between fair 
criticism of a religion and what would be considered blasphemy.  Christians in 
America regularly feel that their religion is blasphemed in the media and in films.  
That does not mean there should be a law outlawing blasphemy against 
Christianity.  Rex appeals to English laws against racial incitement as 
justification.  But, there really is no parallel between criticism of a religion and 
inciting people to violence.  That said, even though there should be no legal 
protection of criticism of religion, people within a society should act responsibly 
and a compelling argument can be made that attacks on a religion are not 
responsible, no matter how legal.   
The bottom line for Rex is that he believes all of these potential hurdles for 
integration in England can be overcome.  As he concludes,  
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All in all one cannot be optimistic that the integration of Muslims in 
Britain will be easy…There is still considerable scope for dialogue 
which is prevented by prejudices on both sides.  On the British side 
there is the widespread dismissal of all Muslims as fundamentalists, 
and on the side of Muslims there has been an unwillingness to 
extend their thinking to deal realistically with the problems of 
Muslims living as a minority in a non-Muslim society.129   
Another potential problem, one alluded to earlier, is that the values that 
undergird the state may come in conflict with some cultural practices, either real 
or pseudo, that are taking place in the private realm.  As one writer states the 
problem while writing about England,  
Multiculturalism holds that all cultures are equal; liberalism is the 
doctrine that all human beings have equal rights; so if a culture 
holds that some human beings (e.g. women) have fewer rights than 
others, then liberalism has to confront that culture and reject the 
multiculturalism sheltering it.  On some issues liberal society can 
reach a modus Vivendi with other cultures – for instance, by 
designing school uniforms that conform to Muslim views of female 
modesty.  On really important questions such as ‘honor killings,’ 
however, liberal society has to impose its own values, without 
apology, if necessary in condign ways.  In practice it has been 
nervous of doing so, and the authorities have until recently turned a 
blind eye to such things.130 
Because of this problem, the state would have to view the spheres as somewhat 
elastic or abandon its own core principles.  The general goal would be to allow as 
much cultural diversity as possible in the private sphere while not sacrificing the 
larger values of the society. 
While Rex’s sphere theory provides a valuable framework, he identifies 
some real problems to its implementation in a society that has a large Muslim 
minority.  Although he somewhat dismisses those challenges, it is clear that the 
implementation of his theory will be difficult at best.  Still, as with differentiated 
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citizenship, it provides a framework to assist in establishing multicultural 
practices that make sense.  Based on the evidence, the general concepts appear 
to be the multicultural framework with the most potential.       
C. SYNCHRONIZING THE TWO THEORIES 
These two theories, differentiated citizenship and the spheres theory, are 
not mutually exclusive.  Differentiated citizenship argues that members of cultural 
groups should be accorded certain rights and privileges that are not necessarily 
extended to the entire population while the Spheres Theory focuses on the 
importance of treating the public and the private sphere differently with the goal, 
to some degree, or creating a shared public sphere and a diverse private sphere.     
If the two theories were combined, the state would still strive for a 
common and shared public culture but would extend differentiated privileges and 
rights to cultural groups in the private sphere designed to enable them to achieve 
their conception of the greater good and maintain their culture.  For the most 
part, when these frameworks are combined, differentiated rights and privileges 
should not be extended in the public sphere since it would threaten the sense of 
equality within the state and potentially breakdown the shared public culture that 
is so important to the establishment of social harmony. 
In the next chapter, we will look at England’s current policies which have 
been enacted since the September 11, 2001 attacks in America and the 2005 
subway bombings in England in light of these two theories.  The purpose of the 
chapter will be to ascertain how much England is already following the precepts 
of these two theories, either purposely or not.  It will also be an attempt to lay out 




IV. FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: ENGLAND’S CURRENT 
POLICY FRAMEWORK 
Now that we have established a couple potential frameworks for 
multiculturalism, we will examine how well England's current policies line up with 
those policies.  The British have been much more proactive in attempting to 
establish an array of policies since the September 11th attacks with the stakes 
raised even higher following the subway bombings in 2005.  That event served to 
shock the nation and was a catalyst for the government to take a hard look at its 
policies and what should be changed.  In a way, for the British public, the subway 
bombings were far worse than the 9/11 attacks in the United States not just 
because they were carried out on British soil but because the attacks were 
carried out by British citizens, men who had been born in England and were a 
product of the British system.  For many, this was unfathomable and it caused 
much soul searching.  It also caused a country that had taken pride in its 
multicultural policies to experience something of an identity crisis.  Many of the 
key assumptions behind these policies were suddenly called into question.  
Because of these attacks, the British approach to multiculturalism and integration 
has shifted from what could be described as a laissez faire approach to 
something much more proactive.  This chapter will examine the new policy 
framework that has emerged since the two seminal terrorist attacks and how they 
align with the two multicultural theories discussed in the last chapter. 
A. MAKING BETTER CITIZENS 
One thing the United Kingdom has done is to revamp nationality laws so 
that immigrants show that they have sufficient knowledge of English in addition to 
“British history, culture, and customs.”131  This is accomplished though the 
passing of a short test or the completion of a citizenship and language class.132  
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The 45-minute test was launched in November 2005.133  The test includes 24 
questions with the general categories of British life and culture, Institutions and 
governance, and history and traditions.  The purpose of this is not hard to 
imagine.  The state is attempting to create, and in some ways enforce, a 
common British culture that extends to all of its citizens.  The English language 
requirement will likely not be an issue that meets with much resistance since 
there appears to be wide agreement among the entire British population that 
learning English is important.  This is one issue on which both the majority and 
minority communities agree.   
The state also introduced a mandatory ceremony where those becoming 
British citizens must swear allegiance to the Queen while pledging to respect the 
nation’s rights and freedoms.134  This could potentially become a problem for a 
reason identified in the last chapter, that the queen, although she is a figurehead, 
is theoretically the head of the official British church, which is Anglican.  
Interestingly, the question, “What is the Church of England and who is the head?” 
also appears on the citizenship test.135  So, at least for the foreseeable future, 
this is unlikely to change.      
In viewing this test in light of the spheres theory, some potential problems 
arise.  While many of the questions are designed at ensuring everyone 
understands the legal and political framework, some of the questions fall within 
the private realm.  Many of the questions attempt to ensure that everyone has 
enough of an understanding of the legal and political framework in the United 
Kingdom to be able to function effectively within the British system.  While this is 
obviously a good thing, other questions miss the mark and appear to be foolish at 
best and inflammatory at worst.  For example, the question on the Church of 
England, a church which is more symbolic than anything, is somewhat foolish 
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considering the religiosity of many of the people who will be taking the test.  Very 
few of the applicants for citizenship are Anglican.  72% of applications for 
citizenship are coming from either Asia or Africa, with the majority of these 
applicants being Muslim.136  To make all of these new citizens learn that the 
queen is the head of the English church and then make them swear allegiance to 
her seems ill-conceived at best.  Another question was “According to Life in the 
UK, where does Father Christmas come from?” or “There are four national saints’ 
days in the UK, one for each nation.  Which order do they fall in the calendar?”137  
Being able to answer these questions does nothing to show that you have 
learned the basics to succeed in the British public culture.  For that matter, they 
have little to do with British history.  But, they do serve to accentuate to the 
person studying the guide and taking the test that they are somehow apart from 
British society.  They are the “other” with a different religion. 
If the Spheres Theory were applied to the test, these types of questions 
would be removed.  The idea of a citizenship test and ceremony, when examined 
in light of the spheres theory, is actually a good one.  It could be used to help 
foster a common public culture.  But, it would have to be designed specifically 
with this purpose in mind.  The purpose would be to ensure that everybody 
understood the basic legal and political framework.  Questions on history would 
also be fine when they are relevant to how this public culture has developed.  An 
example of one such historical question is “The origins of our Parliament were in 
the early Middle Ages.  In 1215 the great barons forced rights from a tyrannical 
King John.  What is that document called?”138  But questions designed to leave 
the impression that the England still has an “official” religion would be removed.  
These do not serve to foster a shared public culture but instead serve to 
accentuate hard to reconcile differences that could potentially break down a 
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public culture.  I am not suggesting that all references to religion should be 
removed.  Where Christianity or any other religion played a role in forming the 
legal or political culture, it certainly could and should be acknowledged.  But, 
questions that purposely or inadvertently leave the impression that one must 
accept the state religion of England to be a good British citizen should be 
removed. 
Another policy change was to announce that all foreign ministers of 
religion who wanted to work in Britain had to “demonstrate a basic command of 
English.”139  This won support from many Muslims in England to include many 
moderate Muslim leaders who believe that English skills are essential for 
religious leaders to carry out their duties as preachers, community leaders and 
counselors.140  This measure fits in nicely with the Spheres Theory.  A common 
language that enables everyone to fully participate in society is an important part 
of a shared public culture.  Allowing foreign ministers to come and preach in a 
different tongue again serves to accentuate differences and can lead to an “us 
versus them” mentality.  But, the government is sending somewhat mixed 
messages on the importance of learning the English language.  For example, in 
2006 the government spent 100 million pounds on translation services, fostering 
the idea that it was not that important for newcomers to learn English.141  As Zia 
Haider Rahman, a Bangladeshi-born human rights lawyer, argued in response to 
this, “We are telling them they don’t have to learn English, let alone integrate.  
Worse, by insulating them, we have created communities that are now incubators 
for Islamofascism.”142  The government could have instead spent that money on 
programs designed to help immigrants to learn English which would have given 
them a valuable tool to more broadly participate in society.  The key for England  
 
                                            
139 Gallis, Muslims in Europe, p. 14. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Mirza, Policy Exchange, p. 24. 
142 Ibid.  
 61
is to align their policies to send the right message.  That message should be that 
the learning of English is important to fully participate in British society.  Because 
of that, we will assist you in learning these vital skills.   
This is a message that would resonate with the population.  A BBC News 
survey indicated that 65% of Muslims supported a requirement for clerics to 
preach in the English language.143  As the BBC News report observed, “More 
than half of UK Muslims were born in the country and younger generations, 
backed by progressive leaders, have long advocated more English in mosques.  
Many believe English-speaking imams help break down cultural divides between 
Islam and mainstream society.”144  Right now, there is a large gap between the 
ideal and reality.  As Dr. Abduljalil Sajid, chair of the Muslim Council for Religious 
and Racial Harmony, observed in the BBC article on how man imams in the UK 
could speak English, “My feeling is that only 10% are well versed in English and 
90% probably speak in their own mother tongue – Turkish, Bengali, Urdu, Hindi, 
Arabic and so on.”145  The policy on testing foreign imams on their grasp of 
English is a good start.  Additional focus should be placed on improving English 
skills within these communities.  England has also been focusing programs on 
training more British-born imams who already have an understanding of the 
language and culture and customs of the state.  The heavy reliance on foreign 
born imams does little to promote integration at worst and is dangerous at best 
since some of them are bringing radicalism with them.         
It is worth noting that encouraging and helping to train English speaking 
and British born imams might not actually accomplish much, at least in the short 
term, in combating radicalism.  A recent study by The Times indicated that even 
with the new focus on training British-born imams, the mosques are becoming 
ever more radicalized as more moderate sects such as the Barelwis lose ground 
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to the more radical Deobandis.  The report indicated that the fundamentalist 
Deobandi sect now runs nearly half of the mosques in England and controls 
seventeen of Britain’s 26 Islamic seminaries.146  The article indicated that the 
man who is in line to lead this sec, Riyadh ul Haq, “supports armed jihad and 
preaches contempt for Jews, Christians, and Hindus.”147  The report also 
indicated that these mosques are preaching an anti-integration message and 
preaching on the value of armed jihad against the west.  The point here is that 
although language does matter, it is still less important than the message itself.  
Encouraging more homegrown imams who speak English and can better connect 
to all of England’s Muslims will do very little if the message does not change as 
well.  In fact, it might actually be harmful since the new radical preachers can 
reach and radicalize a wider audience.  The government does seem to recognize 
this conundrum.  A spokesman for the Department of Communities in the article 
commented “We have a detailed strategy to ensure imams properly represent 
and connect with mainstream moderate opinion and promote shared values like 
tolerance and respect for the rule of law.  We have never said the challenge from 
extremism is simply restricted to those coming from overseas.”148  It appears, at 
least at this juncture, that the strategy has not produced much of a return.  That 
said, a common British language is a good first step and should help to bridge 
the gap between the communities.    
Some proponents of a differentiated citizenship approach would likely 
argue counter to this, arguing that the government should be allowing, and even 
fostering, different languages within different cultural communities.  But, this is 
short-sighted.  In no way does encouraging people to not learn the national 
language or in creating institutions that enable them to not learn the language 
facilitate their greater good.  It also does little, if anything, to foster a cultural 
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identity.  It is also worth noting that there are many languages being spoken 
within these communities and fostering a common national language would 
actually help communication within the communities.  Finally, the English 
requirement wins strong majority support from within the Muslim community so 
there is little evidence that these communities view language as a cultural issue. 
B. OUTREACH TO MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 
A big plank in the United Kingdom’s multicultural policies appears to be an 
outreach to Muslim groups and communities.  Some of these efforts have 
included ministerial outreach to Muslim leaders and to community and youth 
organizations, various recognition programs such as the Muslim News Awards of 
Excellence, and polling research to better understand the views of the Muslim 
communities.149  These efforts have intensified since the subway attacks.  They 
have also established a number of working groups comprised of Muslim leaders 
to “provide advice on an informal basis to the government on ways to reduce 
disaffection and prevent radicalization of young Muslims.”150  Some of the issues 
these working groups have confronted include tackling extremism, local 
initiatives, imams and the role of mosques, and education among others.151  The 
work of these groups has been institutionalized in the Commission on Integration 
and Cohesion which was stood up in 2006.  The goal of the commission is to find 
ways to improve integration efforts.  Some of the measures they have explored 
include establishing citizenship lessons in Muslim schools and recruiting more 
Muslim law enforcement officers.152 
The British government web site described this commission as a fixed 
term advisory body that ”is considering how local areas can make the most of the 
benefits delivered by increasing diversity - but will also consider how they can 
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respond to the tensions it can sometimes cause.  It will develop practical 
approaches that build communities' own capacity to prevent problems, including 
those caused by segregation and the dissemination of extremist ideologies.”153  
The commission gathered inputs up through Spring of this year.and its report 
came out in June.  
 In reading the report, the main conclusion appears to be that what is really 
needed is a new shared public culture.  The foreword begins with the phrase “A 
past built on difference, a future which is shared.”154  This implies a break with 
the past and the creation of something new, a public culture that can be shared 
by all of the United Kingdom’s citizens.  The team attempted to establish four key 
principles that they felt were key to creating a better state.  These were a sense 
of a shared future, an emphasis on a new model of rights and responsibilities, a 
new emphasis on mutual respect and civility, and a system that delivered social 
justice.155  From this list, one gets the sense that they are attempting to create a 
system that has wider buy-in that is viewed as fair by all of the citizens.   
 The report recommends close to sixty initiatives designed to accomplish 
these principles.  They range from adopting a new definition of integration and 
cohesion to establishing a government body aimed at monitoring integration and 
cohesion. 156  Some are focused at the national level while many are focused at 
the local level.  Some other examples are recommendations that businesses 
conduct English training and cultural awareness training, and the establishment 
of training groups.  They recommend targeted recruitment in both the workforce 
and among political parties and flexible working programs for women.157  Other 
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initiatives are aimed at fighting discrimination and establishing an environment of 
mutual tolerance.  Almost all of the initiatives are aimed at creating a shared 
sense of community.  As the report states up front, “As a Commission our vision 
of society is one where people are committed to what we have in common rather 
than obsessing with those things that make us different.”158  The Commission is 
consistent in its recommendations in attempting to reach this goal with nearly all 
of the initiatives supporting this idea. 
 When looking at this in light of the two frameworks, the Commission is 
leaning away from a differentiated citizenship approach.  It is looking for common 
ground within the public space and not encouraging and celebrating differences.  
It is much more in line with Rex’s Spheres Theory with the focus on creating a 
common public culture that is truly shared by everyone.  The report clearly 
believes that a new public culture must be created, one that somewhat breaks 
with the past and focuses on a new shared vision for everyone going forward.  
There is an unstated assumption that there is enough common ground between 
all the citizens to create this common shared culture.  While the vision is a noble 
one, it is not one that can happen easily.  For example, it may require that 
England break with some of its historical artifacts, such as with its state church.  
On the flip side, it would require that members from the minority community buy 
into the goals of democracy and capitalism and mutual tolerance.  Based on the 
survey results that were discussed earlier that reveal a surprisingly high 
percentage among the minority Muslim community that believes England should 
be brought under Shari’a law, this will be a challenge.  But, it clearly is in line with 
the idea that a society needs a shared public culture.   
 One challenge the state has had in improving its dialogue with the Muslim 
community is the diversity of that community.  At times, the state has tended to 
treat the community as being monolithic when it is far from it.  That is one fact 
that is consistent in all of the surveys taken of the community.  For example, 
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during one survey, the Muslim participants were asked to name an organization 
that represented their views.  Only six percent selected the Muslim council of 
Britain with a surprisingly high 51% indicating that no Muslim organization 
represented their views.159  As such, the strategy of attempting to engage the 
community by increasing dialogue and cooperation with certain Muslim 
organizations may be flawed.  As such, the commission’s focus on creating a 
shared public culture makes sense since it is primarily focused on creating a 
sense of community that recognizes commonalities versus differences.  It 
appears to be a deliberate break with differentiated citizenship models that are 
hampered by the diversity of the community and an embrace of models that seek 
common ground.   
C.  FIGHTING RADICALISM AT ITS SOURCE        
 Even while attempting to create a shared public culture, England still must 
fight the radicals in its midst who will not accept this vision.  This is a large break 
from its past practices which actually protected these radicals.  It has stepped up 
its efforts and significantly revered course in this regards.  Since the September 
11 attacks, the government has sought to improve security and bolster law 
enforcement efforts aimed at rooting out terrorism and stopping the spread of 
extremism.  The first legislation that came out in the United Kingdom in the wake 
of the September attacks in America was the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act of 2001.  This was similar in many ways to the Patriot Act in America with the 
goal of expanding police powers, freezing terrorist assets, and providing the 
government a number of tools to combat terrorism, such as allowing the 
government to hold foreign suspects for longer periods of time.  As the 
government website notes,   
The measures were intended to: cut off terrorist funding, ensure 
that government departments and agencies can collect and share 
information required for countering the terrorist threat, streamline 
relevant immigration procedures, ensure the security of the nuclear 
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and aviation industries, improve security of dangerous substances 
that may be targeted/used by terrorists, extend police powers 
available to relevant forces, and ensure that we can meet our 
European obligations in the area of police and judicial co-operation 
and our international obligations to counter bribery and 
corruption.160 
One can see that the initial focus was on expanding police powers to attempt to 
stop terrorist attacks.   
The United Kingdom has gone through the same struggle to balance law 
enforcement efforts against civil liberty traditions that have played out in the 
United States.161  This can be seen in the numbers.  Although almost 800 people 
have been arrested since the 9/11 attacks, “only 121 people have been charged 
with terrorist-related crimes, and only 21 of those have been convicted.”162  The 
bar for convictions remains extremely high.     
There was a general recognition among policymakers that this initial act 
was not enough.  It was designed to stop terrorism but it was attacking the 
problem after it already emerged.  In no way did it attempt to counteract or stop 
the incitement to violence or the spread of hate within the community.  In no way 
did it attempt to change a rapidly growing culture of violence.  The Blair 
Administration stepped forward to champion this cause.  Prime Minster Blair 
outlined a number of plans “to extend powers to deport or exclude foreigners who 
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terror, who were actively spreading hatred.  The new primary offense would be 
justifying or “glorifying” terrorism anywhere.164  Blair sounded like he was quoting 
comic book character Spiderman in defending his policies,  
And the fact that someone comes into our country, and maybe 
seeks refuge here, the fact that we say if, when you are here, you 
want to stay here, play by the rules, play fair, don’t start inciting 
people to go and kill other innocent people in Britain.  I think when 
people say this is an abrogation of our traditional civil liberties, I 
think it is possible to exaggerate that.  I mean, as far as I know 
people have always accepted that with rights come 
responsibilities.165 
The prime minister was successful in codifying his policies into law in 2006 as the 
Terrorism Act of 2006.  
 Not surprisingly, in line with the prime minister’s desire, the focus of the 
new law was on stopping the propagation of hatred and incitement to violence.  
As the government web site notes, “The Terrorism Act specifically aims to make 
it more difficult for extremists to abuse the freedoms we cherish, in order to 
encourage others to commit terrorist acts.”166  It accomplishes this by creating a 
number of new offenses to include acts preparatory to terrorism, encouragement 
to terrorism, dissemination of terrorist publications, and terrorist training 
offences.167  In addition to this, it expanded and clarified some of the powers 
established in the 2001 act.   
The legal framework is not entirely one-sided in that there has also been 
legislation introduced and passed to ensure protection of Muslims by increasing 
penalties for religiously-motivated crimes.  As one report observed, “Supporters 
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of the religious hatred bill argue that it closes a loophole in current UK race-hate 
legislation that protects Jews and Sikhs because they are recognized as ethnic 
groups under British law but does not cover other multi-ethnic faiths such as 
Islam or Christianity.”168  So, the moves by the government to stop incitement to 
hatred and violence has also been accompanied by moves to better protect 
members of all faith communities to include Islam.  This is important due to the 
perception by many Muslims that they are under siege since the terrorist attacks 
in the United States and England.     
 Evaluating these new laws in light of the Spheres Theory offers some 
interesting challenges.  The 2006 law clearly gives the state the power to step 
into the private sphere to stop the incitement of terrorism.  For example, the state 
could potentially close down a book store that was selling certain materials or 
enter a mosque to arrest a foreign cleric who was preaching intolerance and 
hatred.  But, at the same time, the state’s actions are designed to defend the 
public sphere since the actions that are taken place in the private sphere are a 
threat to the overall public sphere.  This highlights the biggest problem with the 
spheres theory.  The line between the public sphere and the private sphere is 
dotted at best.  It is not a hard and fixed boundary.  Activities that take place in 
the private sphere can affect and threaten the public sphere.  The question then 
is what the government can do in this situation. 
 The most logical answer when assessing the Spheres Theory is that the 
government must take action to defend the public sphere but that action, where it 
crosses into the private sphere, must be as limited as possible.  Otherwise it runs 
the very real risk of accomplishing the opposite of what is intended to accomplish 
which in this case would be the further alienation of the minority community and 
an increase in radicalism.  Some believe this is already happening.  As Gallis 
noted, “a March 2004 opinion poll of 500 Muslims in the UK found that more than  
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two-thirds believed that British anti-terrorist laws were being used unfairly against 
the Muslim community.”169  This is a very real problem that needs to be 
addressed.   
 The key for the state is to very specifically and narrowly define the crime 
of incitement to hatred and terrorism.  There is a risk that this can be abused to 
attempt to shut down legitimate criticism of the government if taken too far.  It is 
thus very important that the law enforcement establishment receives a significant 
amount of training on what constitutes this crime and what actions they can and 
should take.  It is also imperative that the state develops a communications 
strategy that explains the law and why it is in place to the minority communities.  
It needs to communicate that this is not a war on Islam but necessary and limited 
steps designed to protect the society for everyone.  If the state is successful in 
creating a sense of a shared public culture, it will help to diffuse some of the 
antagonism towards these policies.  The bottom line is that the state must protect 
the shared public space even if it requires the state to potentially cross into the 
private realm, as it must do in this case.  The key is that the state much use a 
scalpel and avoid the temptation to use a chain saw against this problem.  The 
movements into the private sphere should be limited, well-monitored and with a 
very specific purpose.  Anything more than that runs the risk of undermining what 
the state is attempting to accomplish.  While the United Kingdom’s policies for 
combating terrorism and stopping the spread of radicalism and hatred might not 
be the most important part of its overall efforts to achieve greater integration and 
a shared public culture, its other initiatives can not ultimately be effective unless it 
gets this part right.  The initiatives recommended by the Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion can not succeed unless the state also finds a way to 
effectively combat the radicalism in its midst.   
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D. TACKLING DISCRIMINATION AND DISADVANTAGE 
 One other policy focus of the United Kingdom has been on tackling the 
disadvantage and discrimination that is rampant within the minority communities.  
This is viewed as important because, as discussed earlier in the paper, there is a 
substantial gap between the economic fortunes of the minority community and 
the rest of society.  Unemployment is high among the minority communities and 
educational performance trails well behind the performance of the overall 
community.  This economic disparity is clearly a cause of much of the resentment 
that is flourishing within the minority communities.   
The Blair government argued that many of its programs that were not 
specifically targeted at the Muslim community would help to alleviate some of 
these discrepancies, such as programs to move people from welfare to work, an 
introduction of a minimum wage and family tax credits, and an expansion of early 
childhood educational opportunities.170  The state has gone beyond these 
programs, though, and targeted other programs specifically at the minority 
communities to include “new race equality grants for minority community 
projects…new centers for vocational excellence and entrepreneurship in areas of 
high ethnic minority employment” while also seeking to “improve Muslim housing 
access by removing tax disadvantages for mortgages that comply with Islamic 
law, which forbids paying or receiving interest.”171  In addition, in 1999, the 
government started an ethnic minority achievement grants that “provides a total 
of roughly $300 million annually to local school districts to address the 
educational needs of underachieving ethnic minority groups and students 
learning English as an additional language.”172  Many of these programs show a  
 
 
                                            




shift to a more aggressive attempt by the government to improve educational and 
work opportunities across the society versus the traditional strategy of simply 
enacting tough anti-discrimination laws.   
 One potentially notable shift has been in the funding of faith schools, a key 
initiative under the Blair government.  As part of this initiative, the government 
“has introduced state funding for Muslim schools, although there are only five 
recipients.  State funded schools are required to teach the national curriculum, 
but are free to teach their own syllabus for religious education.”173  The initial 
response of Muslims to this initiative has been generally positive viewing the 
introduction of state-funded Muslim schools as a symbolic victory since it 
indicates “a recognition of the Muslim community’s place in Britain alongside 
other major religions.”174  On the flip side, the population as a whole do not 
support the increase in the number of faith schools with a two-thirds majority 
believing it will actually serve as a barrier to integration and social cohesion.     
When looking at these policies to fight discrimination and disadvantage in 
light of the differentiated citizenship and Spheres Theory, some initial 
observations come to mind.  The Spheres Theory likely derived from Hannah 
Arendt’s initial work in which she included three spheres.  She argued that the 
government’s main role in the second sphere, the social sphere, was to eliminate 
starting level inequities.  As such, the government’s attempts to tackle 
discrimination and, more importantly, starting level inequities, would be viewed 
as extremely important.  While Rex eliminated this sphere and went with a two 
sphere theory, this is easily incorporated into his public sphere.  It is impossible 
to produce a shared public culture in an environment where discrimination exists 
and where starting level inequities lock out a substantial portion of the population 
from succeeding in society.  Even the Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
stressed the importance of this element of any strategy in its overall goal of 
producing a shared public culture.  This will be a long term problem since it will 
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be impossible to eliminate starting level inequalities over night.  These 
inequalities will persist for generations regardless of what policies are initiated.  
This is not to say that these policies are not important.  The government has an 
important role to fight discrimination and do what it can to eliminate starting level 
inequities.  The policies are also symbolic in that they show the communities that 
the government is serious about creating a shared public culture that includes 
opportunities for everyone.  But, the policies are not going to be a silver bullet 
that changes the societal dynamics overnight.   
There are also some elements of differentiated citizenship involved here.  
For example, new programs targeted at the Muslim community that attempts to 
improve access to housing by attempting to overcome barriers to paying interest 
could potentially favor one group over another.  But, the application of a 
differentiated citizenship approach appears to be somewhat minimal.  Even the 
introduction of more faith based schools is tempered by the requirement to teach 
a common national curriculum while allowing freedom in religious teaching.  This 
fits in perfectly to the spheres theory.  The goal is to produce a shared public 
culture while allowing plenty of latitude within the private sphere with the freedom 
to teach the values and tenets of Islam.               
E. CONCLUSION 
When looking at the policy framework that has emerged since the 9/11 
and 7/7 terrorist attacks, one senses a very real change in approach in the 
United Kingdom to multiculturalism and integration.  There appears to be a very 
real movement away from the differentiated citizenship policies often employed in 
the past to a framework much better defined by the spheres theories of Hannah 
Arendt and John Rex.  The United Kingdom is focusing much more on creating a 
shared public culture than on celebrating different cultures.  The policy approach 
is also much more proactive with very real steps being taken to try and create a 
shared public culture that nearly everyone in society will embrace.   
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There is also a recognition that the spread of radicalism is an existential 
threat to the United Kingdom and that it can no longer be tolerated.  Even in an 
ideal situation where most of England’s citizens embrace the idea of a shared 
public culture, there will remain a minority that seeks to destroy this consensus 
and impose their will on society.  As such, the United Kingdom has adopted a 
much more aggressive stance in combating terrorism and radicalism.  Most 
importantly, the state is attempting to stop the spread of radical ideas before they 
take root and grow.  In other words, the state is attempting to stop the terrorists 
before they are created by eliminating the propagation of ideas that leads to their 
creation. 
Most of England’s changing policies and laws fit in nicely with the Spheres 
Theory since most of them are focused on creating a shared public culture.  But, 
clearly these policies are a work in progress as can be seen in some of the ill-
conceived questions on the citizenship test as well as the requirement to swear 
allegiance to a person that is also the head of a national church.  This seems to 
indicate that the shift to a spheres theory approach may not be entirely 
intentional.  Still, there is clearly a movement away from a policy framework 
focused on difference to one focused more on commonalities. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The biggest challenge facing the United Kingdom today is developing a 
strategy on how it should respond to its growing mostly Muslim minority 
community.  This also happens to be the biggest challenge facing Europe as a 
whole.  How can it better integrate this community while stamping out the 
radicalism that has infused a growing minority within it?  How can it reverse a 
trend that has caused the United Kingdom to become one of the premier hotbeds 
for Islamic radicalism while not alienating a larger portion of that community?  
These are questions that do not have easy silver bullet answers.  Based on 
current demographic trends, the Muslim community will continue to grow in size 
and influence as it will across Europe.  Because of this, it is imperative that 
England adopts the right policy framework now before it wakes up one day to 
discover the problem has spiraled beyond its control.  That day may be 
approaching faster than most people realize. 
For a long time, England took great pride in its laissez fair multiculturalism 
believing it had the right framework in place.  The belief of many was that 
integration challenges were faced in continental Europe in places like France and 
Germany but not in England, who had gotten it right.  This assumption was 
challenged by the September 11th attacks in America and further challenged by 
the subway bombings.  England went from being viewed as the multiculturalism 
success story to being recognized as one of the states facing the greatest 
integration challenges due to the growth and spread of radicalism.  Based on 
surveys, it also emerged as one of the states that is viewed least favorably by its 
Muslim population.  Hardly a week goes by without some news story about a 
terrorist plot being thwarted in England or about a captured terrorist having a tie 
back to England.  The myth of the great multicultural state in England has been 
severely challenged. 
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This thesis examined England’s experience with multiculturalism through 
the lens of two theories, differentiated citizenship and the Spheres Theory.  While 
neither theory is perfect, they provide a good framework from which to analyze 
past and present policies.  The biggest limitation with the spheres theory is that 
the lines between the spheres are notably fuzzy with actions taken in one sphere 
frquently effecting the other sphere.  The biggest problem with differentiated 
citizenship is it tends to treat blocks of citizens that are diverse in their views as 
being culturally monolithic.   
England’s policies of the past are best viewed as being a somewhat 
laissez faire differentiated citizenship approach that celebrated and even 
encouraged differences within society.  The government attempted to engage 
citizens based on their differences with little attempt to create a common public 
culture.  Groups were encouraged to compete in the public domain for funding 
and resources based on their perceived cultural identity.  The policies that are 
emerging in the United Kingdom since the two big terrorist attacks in the United 
States and England appear to be a shift away from the differentiated citizenship 
approach to something much better defined by the Spheres Theory.  It is not an 
outright repudiation of differentiated citizenship since some elements remain but 
clearly a recognition that it should be applied in a much more limited fashion.  
The overall goal has changed even if it has not yet been clearly articulated.  No 
longer is the goal to create and encourage the growth of many cultures within the 
public domain but the goal is now to stress the common ties between the 
communities in an attempt to achieve a shared vision for the future.    
The new policy framework is clearly attempting to develop and foster a 
common public culture that everyone can embrace while allowing for differences 
within the private sphere.  This is a radical change for the United Kingdom and it 
is too early to tell whether or not it will be successful.  But, it appears to be the 
best alternative, and the one with the highest chance of success, to the 
differentiated citizenship approach of the past.  In order for this approach to be 
successful, the policy and legal framework will need to be further developed with 
 77
the express goal of creating a shared public culture.  This will likely require some 
sacrifices from both the majority and minority communities.  One sacrifice that 
might be required from the majority culture would be ending the privileged 
position that the Church of England currently enjoys.  A sacrifice that will likely be 
required from the minority and immigrant communities is the need to learn 
English as a pre-requisite to citizenship as well as the embrace of the political 
and legal system.  While this is a work in progress, England clearly has taken 
some important steps in attempting to make this journey.  It has identified the 
importance of a shared public culture and developed a much more aggressive 
policy framework.  
One of the biggest challenges to developing a shared public culture is the 
need for the state to combat radicalism at the same time.  The Blair government 
took important steps towards developing a shared public culture but also 
recognized that this could not succeed without a much more aggressive 
approach to combating terrorism and more importantly the propagation of 
radicalism.  But, this presents a Catch 22 situation for the state in much the same 
way that it has for the United States in the Global War on Terrorism.  The more 
aggressively the state attempts to combat terrorism, the more it can and has 
been perceived to be waging a war against Islam which fuels the very radicalism 
it is trying to combat.  The state risks alienating and further radicalizing a larger 
portion of the community.  It is critical that the United Kingdom develops a 
comprehensive communications plan that explains the purpose of its actions and 
also the positive steps it is taking to improve the lives of its Muslim citizens.  It 
needs to be clear that the actions taken are to better the lives of all the citizens to 
include members of the Muslim community.  The actions taken to combat 
radicalism must be very well defined and specific and limited in their scope.  This 
is not to suggest that the state should be less aggressive.  Based on the severity 
of the threat, if anything, it must be much more aggressive.  But, it needs to 
ensure that law enforcement is properly trained on what it can and can not do  
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and it needs to guard against creating the perception that it waging a war on 
Islam.  It remains to be seen whether or not the state can be successful in this 
effort. 
The title to this thesis asked the question of whether or not 
multiculturalism is the problem or the solution to the integration challenges 
currently facing the United Kingdom.  Based on the evidence, multiculturalism as 
it was applied was certainly a large part of the problem.  It accentuated 
differences while doing nothing to create a common public culture.  It treated a 
diverse community as a monolithic block that, in many instances, strengthened 
the hands of the radicals.  It created an environment that served as an incubator 
for terrorism.  It engaged people not as citizens but as members of religious and 
ethnic groups. 
The more important question is whether or not multiculturalism has been 
completely discredited or whether it can be adopted as the solution to the 
problem.  This is a harder question to answer.  The word multiculturalism has 
come to mean so much that it also frequently means nothing.  But, England is a 
multicultural society.  That is an undeniable fact.  The Spheres Theory appears to 
present the best potential compromise by arguing for the importance of a shared 
public culture while allowing for multiculturalism within the private realm.  In this 
sense, a new form of multiculturalism must be part of the solution, one that is 
very tolerant of differences within the private realm where they do not effect the 
public culture or directly threaten the values or legal framework of the state.  The 
United Kingdom is on the right path.  The state has recognized some of the 
problems created by its past policies and taken the initial steps to develop a new 
policy framework that attempts to create a shared public culture while combatting 
discriminating and starting level inequities.  It should continue on this path and 
refine its approach with the overall goal of a truly shared public culture in which 
all of its citizens feel they have a stake in the future of the state. 
There are a number of questions that remain unanswered by this theis 
and are good areas for further research.  The biggest unanswered question is 
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whether it is possible to effectively combat Islamic radicalism without actually 
bolstering it.  This is a hard question to answer because there does not appear to 
be a good model yet for where it has been done effectively.  This is a question 
that many states are currently trying to answer.  Another key question is whether 
there are enough commanlities between the majority British culture and Muslim 
minority culture to create a shared public culture.  Based on survey results 
discussed in this thesis, it appears that the answer to that question is yes but that 
answer is less than conclusive.  But the state will be attempting to create this 
culture while being resisted by a radical minority of that culture.  It is hard to 
forsee how successful the radicals will be in derailing this effort.   
The importance of this subject can not be overemphasized with the future 
of England, and Europe, at stake.  If the United Kingdom does not succeed, it is 
hard to envision a future that is not filled with civil strife and escalating violence.  
Based on the demographic data, the timeline to get it right is also relatively short.  
If significant progress is not made, the problem will be far worse in a generation 
and potentially catastrophic within a couple generations.  There are no easy 
answers and progress will likely be slow and hard to recognize with setbacks 
along the way.  But, based on the evidence to date and the analysis of how 
theoeries on mutliculturalism can be applied, it appears that an attempt to create 
a shared public culture offers the United Kingdom the best hope of success. 
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